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Abstract
The Central and Eastern European candidates (CEECs) for EU membership are
striving to achieve and sustain above EU-average growth rates that is one of the
prerequisites of catching-up. This paper follows the empirical literature investigating the
relationship between saving, investment and growth, and the  main determinants of
savings. A special emphasis is being put to identify the role of savings and investments
in economic growth and scrutinize the ways how national government and EU policy as
well as other non-policy factors can affect domestic saving rates. In the process of
transition to a market economy a transition in savings can also be distinguished. In the
CEECs it means a dramatic fall in the ratio of savings to GDP from artificially high
levels during socialism. This is followed by the stabilization of this ratio at (or in some
cases recovering to) more normal (equilibrium) rates that are comparable with those of
other market economies at similar level of development.
By now, growth has been restored throughout the region and, with few
exceptions, CEECs have achieved investment rates close to or well above EU-average.
However, some of the less advanced CEECs still have rather low gross saving rates,
well below both EU-average and their investment rates. Large current account deficits
evolving in these countries also reflect this trend. The gap between national savings and
investments has been increasingly filled by foreign capital inflows (foreign savings),
mainly in the form of FDI. However, high sensitivity to worsening investor sentiments
can only be reduced by increasing macroeconomic stability and lifting national savings
more close to investments.
In the early phase of transition there was a shift in the composition of savings
from savings by enterprises and the government to savings by households. Much of the
recent improvement in gross national saving (GNS), however, has been the result of
better profitability and hence higher savings of the corporate sector. All CEECs still
cope with general government deficits that may have a crowding out effect on private
investments. To control the growth of expenditures reforms of the social security system
cannot be avoided. However, due to high transition costs, pension reform is not likely to
result in a noticeable increase in GNS, at least in the sort to medium run. Ongoing
financial reform, although has high fiscal costs, is necessary for sustaining economic
stability and it can enhance the spectrum of saving instruments. Increasing public saving
can be the most direct and efficient way for the governments to lift GNS, however,
CEECs have very limited room for maneuvering. In addition to high costs related to
economic reforms and restructuring, accession to the EU requires substantial further
resources to spend. CEECs, depending on the generosity of EU support, are to
accommodate most of these considerable costs. To sustain growth and global
competitiveness in the long run, beside investment in physical capital, CEECs should
not neglect the importance of investment in human capital and knowledge (R&D), the
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key growth factors of our age. Saving should constitute an element of a broad and
coherent economic strategy. The most certain way of lifting national saving rates of the
CEECs seems to be via growth.
vForeword
by János Gács
This paper is one of the results of a broad, multi-year research project of the Economic
Transition and Integration  Project of IIASA entitled “Catching Up and EU Accession –
Prospects for First and Second Wave Countries”. The research was particularly
encouraged by IIASA’s Swedish and Hungarian national member organizations, while
financial support was provided by the (then) Swedish national member organization, the
Swedish Council for Planning and Coordination of Research (FRN). Preparations for
the project started in 1999. In addition to other forms of communication two workshops,
one in Budapest in January 2000, and one in Stockholm in May 2001, helped to
elaborate the research agenda, coordinate collaborative work and discuss results.
Publication of the studies prepared in the framework of this projects started in
September 2001.
The main ideas of the research project can be summarized as follows.
The accession of the Central and East European countries (CEECs) to the EU is
likely to lead to conflicts between these countries and the incumbent members unless
there is a rapid narrowing of the gap in per capita incomes between them. The CEECs
are much poorer and have proportionately much larger agricultural sectors than the
average EU country, and their combined populations make up between one-fourth and
one-third of that of the current EU. Due to these characteristics there is concern in  EU
member states about a mass migration from the East following accession, about social
and environmental “dumping” from CEECs, and about an increased demand by the
CEECs on the EU's Structural and Cohesion Funds, as well as on the funds provided
under the Common Agricultural Policy.
These concerns, however, are counterbalanced to a large degree by a “catching
up” predicted by both theory and experience: poorer countries, unless their development
is impeded by institutional barriers, usually develop faster than richer ones, and there is
a tendency toward convergence in levels of GDP per capita. In recent years, this
catching up process seems to have started. In addition, trends in capital inflows and
stock market developments suggest that the expected return on capital in the region is
sufficiently high to support the buildup of stronger production capacities.
The research project on catching up studied the pattern according to which
preparations for membership can trigger changes that will affect the growth process
before and after membership. Special attention was paid to CEECs in different
positions: those that started negotiations in 1998 and may reach membership first, and
those that started negotiations in 2000. The effects on the sources of growth in both the
pre-accession and post-accession periods were studied.
vi
The following specific topics were investigated by the contributors of the
project: the relevance of the export led East Asian development experience for CEECs;
the forces of convergence and divergence that worked in the less developed EU member
states (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece) following their accession; the mixed
experience of East Germany in catching up in a growth theoretic perspective; the role of
domestic savings and savings behavior in the catch-up process; the likely pattern of the
so-called Balassa-Samuelson process (real appreciation associated with the expected
rapid productivity growth) in the course of the convergence; evaluation of the possible
effects of EU structural aid on the candidate countries’ development based on the
experience of the cohesion countries of the EU; financial convergence of the candidate
countries to the EU and the growth process; the role of institutions in the process of
transition and catching up; and the relationship between the growth process and human
development (health, education, standard of living, including inequality) in the context
of EU accession.
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1. Introduction1
By the end of the past century 10 Central and Eastern European countries
(CEECs) (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia in 1998,
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia in 2000) have been invited to start
negotiations for EU membership. At the dawn of the new millennium the Eastern
enlargement of the EU seems to be one of the most significant challenges that both
member and candidate countries face. This would make it possible to unify the two  -
over many years  - artificially separated parts of Europe as well as to initiate a real
Europe-wide integration, unknown until know as far as the number of participating
countries and its deepness are concerned. Stability and strength of the forthcoming EU
will largely depend on whether economic convergence can be achieved, otherwise
widening differences may undermine the integration process itself. Thus it is of utmost
importance to know how economic growth can be accelerated in the CEECs. The aim of
my paper is to identify the role of saving and investment in economic growth and
catching-up and to scrutinize in what ways national government and EU policy, as well
as other non-policy factors can influence growth prospects.
2. Survey of relevant empirical literature
2.1. Saving - Investment - Growth:  ways of interrelation
In this section I will summarize the results of a few comprehensive
macroeconomic studies analyzing links between saving and investment, as well as
growth. In 1998 a World Bank conference "Saving in the World" was held for which a
lot of valuable papers were prepared based on the largest data set of aggregate saving
measures and other statistics assembled to date covering some 150 countries over the
post WWII period. Here I shall refer to some of them, first to those which analyze
savings in a broader context, namely the correlation between savings and growth.
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 In the Figures and Tables the following abbreviations will be used:  Cz = Czech Republic, Est
= Estonia, Hu = Hungary, Pol = Poland, Se = Slovenia; all these are group 1998: (G-1998).
Bu = Bulgaria, Lat = Latvia, Lit = Lithuania, Ro = Romania, Sa = Slovakia; all these are Group
2000: (G-2000). CEEC = all 10 candidate countries. The groups are used for statistical purposes
only.
2Attanasio, Picci and Scorcu (1999) analyzed both contemporaneous
correlations and dynamic models and applied the concept of Granger causality to denote
the fact that a variable is correlated with the lagged values of the other. They claimed
that dynamic correlation can be quite different from the contemporaneous ones. Their
main findings were as follows:
(a) growth and saving seem to be mutually and positively related
(b) lagged saving rates are positively related to current investment rates
(c) also lagged investment positively Granger causes saving
(d) growth positively Granger causes investment
(e) but investment rates Granger-cause growth rates with a negative sign
The findings (a-d) can be explained without apparent difficulty. For instance, as
supposed,  higher growth may drive saving up, leading in turn to higher investment.
Higher growth can enhance future growth expectations and returns to investment, thus,
provided that saving is not a limiting factor, the accumulation of physical capital will
finally take place. Although no exact mechanisms are known, if an increasing demand
for capital goods stimulates saving, maybe through interest rate effects or development
of the financial instruments that permits the mobilization of saving, savings may also
adjust to investment. However, the most difficult finding of this paper to interpret seems
to be the negative Granger-causation running from investment to growth rates. This
result is quite surprising, and stands in sharp contrast to findings of several other papers
and growth regressions.
Dani Rodrik in his recent paper "Saving Transition" (Rodrik, 1998) prepared as
part of the World Bank research project on saving, reversed the course of the analysis
and put as a starting point the actual growth performance of countries. He observed
whether growth transitions preceded, ran parallel to, or followed the transition in saving.
According to his definition transition is a sustained increase in the saving (investment)
rate or growth rate, a shift by more than 5 percentage points of the national income, or
2.5 percentage points in the growth rate of real GNP, respectively. (For instance, he
applied the following filter to the time series of saving rates for each country. A country
is said to undergo a saving transition at year T if the three year moving average of its
saving rate over a nine-year period starting at T exceeds by more than 5 percentage
points the five year average of its saving rate prior to T. He excluded cases where the
post-transition saving rate remained below 10 per cent as well as recipients of large
resource windfalls.). The most important findings of his research are as follows:
♦ Countries that undergo growth transitions - due to improved terms of trade,
increased domestic investment, and other reasons - often do end up with
permanently higher saving rates.
♦ By contrast, countries that undergo saving transition do not necessarily
experience sustained increases in their growth rates. With some exceptions, the
typical pattern is that temporarily higher growth rates return to pre-transition
levels within a decade.
♦ Based on his results he concludes: focusing on saving performance only does not
seem to be a profitable strategy for understanding what makes for successful
economic performance. Several examples demonstrate that the key to generating
3virtuous cycles of high growth-high investment-high saving is to increase the
profitability of enterprises, for instance, by enhancing production and investment
incentives.
It seems worthwhile to look at his empirical findings more thoroughly. He
identified only 20 cases for savings transition (the World Bank’s database covers over
130 countries and a maximum of 35 years). The list includes many well-known cases,
such as Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Chile, China or Mauritius, but many surprises, as
well (e.g. Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Pakistan, Philippines, Costa Rica, Panama, Belize etc.)
The median saving rate in the sample goes from 14%  in the five years before transition
to 23% in the next five years and 25% in the five years thereafter. In this sample there
were some spectacular reversals towards pre-transition levels, e.g. in Egypt, Philippines,
Portugal etc. Looking at saving transitions and investment, the correlation seems
particularly strong. Also saving transitions were usually associated with sharp increases
in growth rates, but in many cases the increase in growth proved to be only temporary.
There are some interesting cases where high and increasing saving rates did not
coincide with high growth rates, but usually with parallel movement of the investment
rates. Mauritius, Panama, Malta and some other countries can be good examples, at
least for some period of time. It may indicate inadequate efficiency of investments and
also suggests that the increase in savings cannot be considered as a guarantee for
acceleration of growth. On the other side of the coin, 18 countries were selected as
having undergone growth transitions. Among them there are 10 countries which had
saving transition as well, however, the dates do not always coincide. (Actually, in 5
cases growth transition preceded savings transition). There are, however, further
countries having undergone growth but no saving transitions, such as Bangladesh,
Brazil, Dominica, Thailand etc. (Note: In Thailand saving rate also increased, but more
gradually than it was given in the original definition.) It is quite surprising to see that
saving performance, in almost two-thirds of cases, continued to improve even in years,
when growth already slowed down. On the basis of Granger-causality tests run on
pooled country data, Rodrik has found that in the very short run (using lags of a single
year) growth precedes saving. (Note: He has also identified, however, that saving
negatively Granger-causes growth).
Loayza, López, Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (1998), based on the largest and
most systematic collection to date of annual time-series on country saving and saving
related variables, have drawn up the main trends in the world pointing also to
differences between the highly developed and developing countries. Their main findings
are as follows:
♦ The world’s average gross national saving rate has been declining for the last
three decades. The median saving rate fell from 21.1% in 1965-73 to 20.5% in
1974-84, and further to 18.7% in 1985-1994. (Incomplete data sets have made it
not possible to extend the analysis further, however, the strengthened efforts of
EU countries to meet the Maastricht criteria as well as several Latin American
countries pursuing macroeconomic stabilization policies suggest that there may
have been a break in the trend in the second half of the 1990s.)
♦ Saving rates show large international dispersion mainly due to different and
even diverging saving patterns within the developing world. Saving rates rose
sharply in China and the nine other so-called take-off countries (e.g. Hong
4Kong, Indonesia, South-Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand,
Mauritius and Chile), while in other developing countries and regions stagnated
and even declined over the last three decades. On the other hand, the median
saving rate in the industrial countries decreased from its historical peak of 27.5%
in 1972-73 to 19% in 1992-93. Low saving countries tend to have higher saving
volatility, as well.
♦ The median public saving rate in the developing countries fell sharply till the
early 1980s. Since then, however, fiscal adjustment has proved successful in
raising rates back to (or over) previous peaks. Industrial countries’ median public
saving rate declined significantly from the mid 1970s to reach negative levels in
the early 1990s.
♦ Median private saving rate has declined in developing countries but has
remained roughly constant in the industrial countries since 1973, although with
large differences across countries.
♦ The median world gross domestic investment ratio to GDP2 declined from 26%
in 1972-73 to 22% in 1992-93, a trend observed in industrial and developing
countries alike, however, the latter group exhibited a temporary investment
boom during 1974-82. On the contrary, in the take-off countries and China
investment rates increased sharply.
♦ The correlation between national saving and domestic investment rates is
positive and significant. Also investment rates and real per capita growth rates
are positively correlated. Based on a sub-sample of countries, the household and
corporate saving offsetting is high.
Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (Loayza et al. II, 1998) based on the
results of the same empirical analysis mentioned above, have tried to identify the main
policy and non-policy determinants of saving. Some of their main findings are as
follows:
♦ Estimates show that an increase in external saving (on the other side of the coin,
a worsening of the current account deficit) is partly offset by a decline of private
savings. The offset (or crowding out) coefficient is in the order of 30% in the
short run, and about 56% in the long run. This highlights the common view that
foreign saving not only complements but to a considerable extent substitutes
domestic private saving. (See also Bayoumi et al., 1995)
♦ The short-term (within one year) response of private saving to any
contemporaneous policy change is magnified (by approximately 2.3 times) in
the long run.
♦ Policy changes causing a permanent increase in private income will be almost
fully reflected in increased consumption, while the same policy, if only
temporary, has a significant effect on saving.
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 Gross domestic investments are gross national investments corrected with the balance on the
current account.
5♦ Public-sector saving is the most direct tool available for policy makers targeting
the level of national saving, because private saving offsets only part of any
increase in public saving.
♦ Macroeconomic uncertainty - proxied by the inflation rate - has a positive effect
on private saving rates due to precautionary motives. However, stabilization also
affects savings through other indirect channels (e.g. growth, fiscal adjustment)
as well, that are likely to more than compensate for any direct effect of inflation.
♦ Financial liberalization shows a robust negative direct effect on both private and
national savings (usually by raising real interest rates and relaxing borrowing
constraints, since both are negatively correlated with private savings), however,
financial reform has a positive impact on growth, and through this channel, a
potentially important indirect effect on saving.
♦ Both income levels and growth rates affect positively the saving rates, however,
the effect of the level of development tapers off at medium or high levels of per
capita income.
♦ Policies that spur development are an indirect but most effective way to raise
saving. To the extent increased saving is channeled into productive domestic
investment, successful growth policies may be able to set in motion a virtuous
cycle of saving, capital accumulation, and growth.
2.2. Identification of saving determinants
In this section one can find a review of the results of some papers striving to
identify the determinants of saving. Here I collect the pros (+) and cons (–) as for each
possible determinant and refer to the sources. The signs applied throughout this section
mean: (+) positive effect; (–) negative effect; (ø) no statistically significant relationship;
(?) the relationship is not obvious and there are different results depending on the
measures of saving and/or samples;
Determinants of gross national saving
( 	

1. Income levels
(+) a) Loayza et al.: Significant and positive cross-country correlation with real
per capita income levels. The correlation is higher for developing countries.
Saving-income relation seems to taper-off at high income levels.
2. Income growth
(+) a) Rodrik: Income growth exerts a statistically significant positive effect on
the saving rate. This effect operates entirely on private saving. He found that an
increase in the growth rate of 1 per cent raises the saving rate of the following
year by 0.2-0.3 percentage points of national income. (Note: based on a narrow
sample of countries with saving transition).
(+) b) Loayza et al.: Saving rates and growth rates are positively correlated, and
this correlation is higher for industrial than for developing countries. Their
6regression suggests that an increase in growth by 2 percentage points per annum
is associated with a 2.5 percentage-point increase in the national saving rate.
(+) c) Loayza et al. (II):  An increase in the growth rate of income by 1
percentage point raises private saving rate by almost 1 percentage point, as well.
3. Public saving - partial crowding out
(+) a) Rodrik: Public saving exerts a strong positive effect on aggregate saving.
While public saving does crowd out private saving, the crowding out is far from
complete. An increase in public saving of 1 percentage point of national income
raises total national saving by 0.40-0.74 points. Mobilizing public saving seems
to be one of the most potent ways of raising national saving.
(+) b) Loayza et al.: the correlation is positive and high.  There is only a
partial offsetting of private and public savings, however, the correlation
coefficients differ across countries and country groups.
(+) c) Loayza et al. (II).:  An increase in the public saving ratio by 1
percentage point reduces the private saving rate by under one-third of a point in
the short run and close to two-thirds of a point in the long run.
(+) d) Dayal-Gulati et al. government saving crowds out private saving only
partially (based on a sample of Southeast Asian and Latin American countries).
(+) e) Bayoumi et al.  the offset (averaging 60%) although large, is
considerably below unity. Moreover, it depends on whether changes in the
government fiscal position are due to government spending or tax changes.
(+) f) OECD (2000): The effect of lower government spending on growth
depends on the composition and efficiency of the government expenditures,
while the magnitude of crowding out depends on the ways how they are
financed. (Note: Evaluating these effects the Ricardian equivalence should also
be taken into account here).
4. Share of social security spending in total public expenditure
(?/ø) a) Loayza et al.: the correlation is not robust across different saving
measures and samples. It is positive in industrial countries, but close to zero in
developing economies.
5. Taxation and social security transfers
(?) a) Besley et al.: If the overall saving effect of tax incentives is positive, it is
generally found to be small. There are potential long run benefits to developing
particular sectors through tax incentives. This however, has less to do with the
creation of new savings than portfolio shifts.
(–) b) Tanzi et al.: The evidence of OECD countries shows that the shares in
GDP of both total taxes and income taxes have a highly significant and strongly
negative impact on household saving rate. The impact of consumption taxes is
quantitatively less pronounced, but still statistically significant.
(–) c) Callen et al.: Evidence from 21 OECD countries suggests that higher
reliance on direct income taxes as opposed to indirect taxes appears to be
7associated with lower household saving. Higher government transfers in the
social security and welfare systems are also associated with lower saving.
(–) d) Dayal-Gulati et al.  social security expenditures are associated with
lower private saving (based on a sample of Southeast Asian and Latin American
countries).
(–) e) Ricardian equivalence
6. Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) versus fully funded pension schemes, provident funds
(?/+) a) Samwick: Countries that operate unfunded or PAYG social security
systems tend to have lower saving rates, and this effect increases with the
coverage rate of the system, although the statistical significance of the negative
coefficients is weak. On the other hand, no county other than Chile that moved
toward fully-funded systems experienced a significant increase in the trend of
savings after the reform (incl. Switzerland, UK, Italy etc.). Due to the limited
time period and the small number of countries that can be studied, yet no
definitive conclusions can be drawn about a casual relationship between the type
of pension system and the rate of saving.
(+/-) b) Dayal-Gulati et al.: Fully-funded pension schemes generally have a
positive effect on private saving. However, where restrictions on withdrawals
from these funds were eased, the effect on saving was found to be smaller or
ambiguous (based on a sample of Southeast Asian and Latin American
countries).
(?/+) c) Faruqee et al.: Compulsory provident fund saving appears to have had
little or no consequence for the trend rate of saving in Malaysia, but there is
some evidence of long-run impact in Singapore.
7. Inflation
(?) a) Loayza et al.: the correlation is not robust across different measures of
saving and samples. It is usually negative but not significant, however, at the
household level it turns positive.
(+) b) Loayza et al.(II):  Positive effect on private saving. Increased
uncertainty induces people to save a larger fraction of their income due to
precautionary motives.
8. Financial reform/liberalization
(–) a) Bandiera et al.: There is no firm evidence that financial liberalization will
increase saving. On the contrary, the indications are that liberalization overall,
and in particular those elements that relax liquidity constraints, have been
associated with a fall in saving. There are neither positive nor significant interest
rate effects. Thus, it would be unwise to rely on an increase in private savings as
the channel through which financial liberalization can be expected to increase
growth. (Based on the analysis of eight developing countries).
(?) b) Beck et al.: The long-run links between banking development and private
savings are more tenuous. However, it has a causal impact on total factor
productivity growth, which in turn feeds through to overall GDP growth.
8(–/?) c) Loayza et al.(II): Financial liberalization has not got any positive direct
effects on saving, however, there is evidence that financial reform has a positive
impact on growth, and through this channel, a potentially important indirect
effect on saving. By relaxing borrowing constraints and lifting real interest rates,
it may have a negative effect, though. At the same time it broadens the diversity
of available saving instruments. (Supplementary note: Due to heterogeneous
informational content of measured interest rates in the sample (i.e. both countries
with liberalized financial markets and with administrative interest rate controls
were incorporated) further empirical experiments are needed. Nevertheless, in no
case did the authors find a positive and significant impact of the real interest rate
on saving. As a result of financial liberalization real interest rates typically
increase, the banking sector grows, the size of outstanding monetary and
financial liabilities increases, and private sector credit flows expand.)
9. M2 money stock ratio to income
(+) a) Loayza et al.: positive, and larger for industrial countries.
(ø) b) Loayza et al.(II): but small and insignificant impact on private saving.
10. Private financial wealth
(+) a) Loayza et al.: positive, significant and larger for industrial countries.
11. Real interest rates
(–) a) Rodrik: negative and strong statistical relationship. Lagging the real
deposit rate do not change the result. Saving transitions are usually associated
with significant reductions in real deposit rates.
(?/-) b) Loayza et al.: the correlation is not robust across different measures of
saving and samples. However, it is negative in industrial countries and the same
for savings at household level.
(–/?) c) Loayza et al.(II): negative impact on private saving rate (i.e. income
effect outweighs the sum of its substitution and human wealth effect).(See also
notes*)
(?) d) Ogaki et al.:  elasticity of saving to real interest rates is highly
dependent on the level of development. Low income developing countries
exhibit a negligible response as compared to middle and high income countries.
But above a certain level, subsistence plays little role in the expenditure patterns
of most households.
12. Stock of private credit
(ø) a) Rodrik: no significant effect on saving
(ø) b) Loayza et al.: the correlation is not robust across different measures of
saving and samples.
but (–) c) Loayza et al.(II): relaxation of credit constraints leads to decreasing
private saving (a 1 percentage point increase in the private credit flow to income
ratio reduces the long-term private saving rate by 0.74 percentage points).
913. Aid flows from abroad
(+) a) Rodrik: positive and significant relationship. About 50 cents of a dollar of
aid end up as increased saving.
14. Foreign borrowing constraints
(+) a) Loayza et al.(II.): leads to an increase in private saving.
15. Workers’ remittances
(+) a) Rodrik: in a sub-sample of countries it was an important determinant of
saving transitions. Some countries received remittances in access of one per cent
of GNP such as Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Portugal, Malta etc.
16. Trade (exports) to GNP ratio
(–) a) Rodrik: negative and significant relationship with private saving. The
reason is unclear.
but (+/?) b) Levine et al.: In their sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth
regressions identified positive and robust correlation between growth and the
share of investment in GDP, and between the investment share and the ratio of
international trade to GDP.
17. Improving terms of trade
(+) a) Rodrik: Positive and significant relationship and it is primarily private
saving that is affected.
(ø) b) Loayza et al.: not significant
(+) c) Loayza et al.(II): positive effects. Permanent terms of trade windfalls are
consumed almost in full, while temporary windfalls have a much larger effect on
saving.
18. Urbanization
(+) a) Rodrik: Positive and significant relationship and it is primarily private
saving that is affected.
(?/ø) b) Loayza et al.: the correlation is not robust across different measures of
saving and samples. At the world level it is positive, also for developing
countries, but turns negative for industrial countries.
but (–) c) Loayza et al.(II): by lacking the means to diversify away the high
uncertainty of their mostly agricultural income, rural residents tend to save a
larger proportion of their income.
19. Dependency ratio3
(ø) a) Rodrik: no significant effect on saving in his sample.
                                                
3
 The ratio of population above 65 (old age) or below 15 (young age) to the working age
population (those aged 15-64).
10
(?/–) b) Loayza et al.: the correlation is not robust across different measures of
saving and samples. For household saving, the correlation with old-age
dependency ratio is systematically negative. The world cross-country correlation
between saving and young-age dependency ratio is also negative.
but (–) c) Loayza et al.(II): both young and old age dependency ratios have a
significantly negative effect on private saving rate. The results are consistent
with standard life-cycle models of consumption.(See also notes*)
(–) d) Bayoumi et al.: The aging of the population will generate significant
downward pressure on private saving rates in most industrial countries, however,
in many developing countries, the increase in the old age dependency ratio may
be offset by a decrease in the young age dependency ratio.
(–) e) Heller et al.: Aging can significantly reduce the private and national saving
rates in the Tiger economies, particularly after 2025.
(–) f) Faruqee et al.: Shifts in the demographic structure of the population appear
to be the main factor explaining the sustained rise in the rate of saving in
Southeast Asian countries.
*) Theoretical notes: In the modern theories of consumption, such as the life cycle
theory (see e.g. F. Modigliani) and the theory of permanent income (see M. Friedman),
the rate of growth is determined by demographic factors (e.g. the structure of the
population) and the desire to smooth the consumption path over the entire life-span,
which requires defining the lifetime income or the permanent income. These theories
are mainly to explain consumption and saving patterns at the household level. The
effects of real interest rates on household savings can also be explained with life cycle
theories. Accordingly, an increase in real interest rates is supposed to exert effects on
household consumption/saving through three channels: income effect used to induce
higher consumption, while both substitution and human wealth effects generally lead to
lower consumption. (For more details and overview of the literature see e.g. Liberda et
al., 1999).
3. Catching-up and sustainable growth in Central and Eastern
Europe
CEECs are striving to achieve and sustain above EU-average growth rates to
catch-up to EU income level. Maintaining the trend of convergence following (and even
before) Eastern enlargement would be a key factor behind successful economic and
social integration. As a starting point we should turn our attention to the recent income
position of the Eastern candidates. In PPP terms, the 10 CEECs that applied for
membership have an average income level of only 39 per cent of the EU-15 average
(1999). However, individual countries differ widely according to the level of
development. I should emphasize here that the grouping of countries (into Group 1998
and Group 2000) reflects the years when the CEECs were invited by the EU to start
official negotiations (and hence more or less the initial level of their preparedness), but
does not reflect their subsequent development nor the actual differences across countries
in several fields. Applying this classification throughout this paper bears only of
statistical significance and does not necessarily reflects an evaluation. Based on GDP
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per capita, of the 10 CEECs by far Slovenia is heading the row (see Figure 1). By 1999
Slovenia reached an income level (70% of EU-15 average) surpassing by 2-3 percentage
points the income position of Greece, the less developed of the present EU member
countries. By the same time the Czech Republic reached 60%, Hungary 50%, Poland
40% and Estonia 37%. Of the countries which started negotiations in 2000, Slovakia
had a level of per capita GDP 46% as compared to the EU-15. All other CEECs had an
income level below one-third of the EU-15 average. At first sight the Eastern
enlargement of the EU seems unprecedented, both as far as the number of candidates
and their average level of development are concerned, however, the most advanced
CEECs may be eligible for comparison with former less developed accession countries.
When joined the EU Greece had a per capita income level 70% of the EU-15 (although
that time the EU (EC) consisted of less countries than now and also the average income
level was lower), Spain 72%, Ireland 62%, Portugal 53%. In many respects CEECs
have developed beyond the level that the candidate countries in former enlargements
reached before their accession, although the EU itself  is developing continuously hence
setting now much stricter (but not yet Maastricht) requirements against the newcomers
to meet.
Figure 1
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It should be emphasized, however, that catching-up has not been a continuous
trend since CEECs stepped on the path of building a market economy. Right at the
beginning, the first years of transition were characterized by a dramatic shrinkage in the
economy. No CEEC escaped this collapse in output, however, countries differed
considerably by the magnitude and length of time of contraction. Actually we can speak
about catching-up in most countries since the second half of the 1990s, however, a
general pattern can hardly be identified. From this point of view it may worth looking at
12
Figure 2 depicting the level of GDP in 1999 as compared to what was registered ten
years before. By 1999 out of the CEECs only Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia have
reached their pre-transition (1989) level of output, but Hungary and the Czech Republic
have also approached this level. In the other CEECs either the fall of output was so
dramatic or the recovery has been less pronounced that a decade has proved not enough
to get out from the transition related hole.
Figure 2
Level of real GDP in 1999 (1989=100)
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Data source: EBRD, 2000.
3.1. Savings (in) transition: crises and challenges
In this section we can follow the trend how savings, investment and growth have
developed in the CEECs since the late 1980s. Although transition to a market economy
can be monitored from several points of view, here I will focus on the saving and
investment patterns. Interestingly, transition itself can be defined in several ways,
although the term is most widely used to describe the transformation of a country from
centrally planned (socialist) economy to a fully-fledged (developed) market economy.
Transition necessitates to complete far-reaching policy, economic and institutional
reforms.
When one compares the development of the CEECs with other developing
countries in East Asia, Latin-America or less developed present EU member countries,
several similarities can be seen. Almost all impediments that were in the way of
economic development of these latter countries have also hindered growth in the
CEECs. If we take a glance at what kinds of crises other countries have gone through in
the post war period we can see that the CEECs have also been forced to face most of
them (e.g. oil crises of the 1970s, debt crisis of the 1980s, market crises of the early
1990s /recession in Western Europe, collapse of the CMEA/ etc.). We can continue with
the most recent challenges stemming from world-wide market liberalization,
13
globalization, and further integration in the EU aiming at the Economic and Monetary
Union. Countries that took part in former enlargements of the EU face these new
challenges while already being part of the EU and may be with more time for
preparation, while the CEECs are forced to make accelerated adjustments based mainly
on their own efforts. The Eastern candidates for EU membership with only one or less
than one decade history of market economy development (disregarding now experiences
before WWII) are to meet the same challenges that even the most developed countries
find difficult to face. Last, I can refer here to the most recent crises, the Asian and
Russian ones, that affected emerging markets in Eastern and Central Europe more than
the EU. These developments also render us some important lessons. The deepness and
quality of reforms (i.e. structural and institutional adjustment) are not less important
than the speed. Legal and institutional development should progress parallel to real
development. Not all the suggestions by market economy experts work properly in the
CEECs, the special features and circumstances of the transition countries should also be
taken into account.
Stages of the transition to the market economy can be identified in several ways.
The first stage (early phase) can be characterized by a demise of the former economic
system, because some time the destruction is bigger than building (of new mechanisms,
institutions, economy, etc.). In the intermediate stage stabilization is achieved, the
economy is reaching stagnation, and gets on a growth track. In a third, more advanced
stage (mature economy phase), economic recovery is sustained, based on real economic
as well as institutional and policy development that, by the end, makes market
mechanisms work in a similar way as in developed market economies. Certainly, there
are several other classifications for the stages of development (some distinguish even
more stages), the point is that the transition is far from being a continuous trend
(sometimes there are setbacks, as well) and several stages can be identified during
transition. From Figure 3 we can follow the growth trends in the CEECs.
Similarly to different phases of economic growth during transition to market
economy, a transition in savings can also be distinguished. The term saving transition
can be found in several papers (see e.g. Asilis-Ghosh, 1992; Rodrik, 1998), however, it
is mostly used to describe the development of savings during takeoff periods and not
applied for transition countries only. Actually, in the case of the CEECs it means a
dramatic fall in the savings ratio to GDP from artificially high levels during socialism
before stabilizing it at (or in some cases recovering to) more normal rates that are
comparable to those of other market economies. Also the composition of savings does
change. Although this trend is more or less typical, the CEECs show quite different
patterns as far as the long-run rate of savings, the timing and the relationship with
growth are concerned.
It should be noted here that although both the availability and reliability of
statistics have improved considerably in the CEECs since the transition began,
significant shortcomings have remained yet. This may be less valid for the main
macroeconomic indicators and more for national accounts statistics from which our data
on savings and investment ratios can be obtained. Sometimes there are large
discrepancies between national statistics and figures of different international
institutions. This emphasizes the importance that figures should still be treated with
some caution, however, I think that the main trends that can be drawn up from these
statistics are not basically affected by these shortcomings. Thus in the following
14
sections the main trends will be important to watch and not the precise year on year
change suggested by statistics.
Figure 3
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3.1.1. Forced savings and centrally-planned investments during socialism
Savings and investments usually show parallel movement in the long run, and
there is a strong (two-way) relationship between saving/investment and growth. But not
in centrally planned economies, where market mechanisms (such as prices) are
depressed and almost all factors are artificially controlled. (For a detailed overview of
savings under central planning see e.g. EBRD, 1996; Denizer-Wolf, 1998; Kornai,
1992). In the pre-transition phase centrally-planned economies had surprisingly high
saving and investment rates (above 30-40%), significantly higher than developed
market economies. These rates were comparable with those of the fast growing East
Asian countries (which have by far the highest rates over the world), however, without
similar impressive results in growth records. These high rates of savings and
investments stemmed from the idea that centrally specified growth rates could be
achieved by forced savings and directed capital accumulation. State budget played an
outstanding role in the allocation (redistribution) of savings. Countries under central
planning aimed at surpassing growth trends of market economies based mainly on
extensive economic expansion with intensified use of physical capital, labor and natural
resources, almost independently of their effectiveness and costs. Not quite surprisingly
this forced economic development resulted in declining returns to investment and thus
also in disappointing growth rates that became more obvious over time. Sluggish
technological progress and poor efficiency in the allocation of resources can also be
identified as factors behind the poor results.
The composition of saving and investment in centrally planned economies was
also rather different as compared to market economies, with much emphasis on
enterprise savings and less on household savings. Up to the end of the 1980s general
government sectors were more or less in balance.  Due to artificially set input and
output prices and a complex system of taxes and transfers, the enterprise sector had
substantial surpluses that were redirected to fund planned investments. By contrary, low
saving rate of households can be explained by several factors. First, under socialism
employment was guaranteed and the state provided a generous "cradle to grave" social
safety net. Under these circumstances there was little motive of   precautionary savings
for a rainy day or retirement. Second, there was only a limited  range of saving
instruments, mainly domestic and foreign currencies and deposits in state savings banks.
Third, due to several forms of in-kind allowances, the level of monetization of
households’ income was rather low. Fourth, due to centralized wage settlements and
controlled sales channels the consumption was also kept in hands.
All these factors notwithstanding, because of unavailability or shortage of
several types of consumer goods (especially durables like TV set, car, refrigerator etc.)
that characterized all these countries we can also speak about involuntary or forced
savings. Denizer and Wolf (1998) have tried to assess the extent of involuntary savings
by comparing the predicted (hypothetical) saving rates with the actual ones, taking into
account characteristics of market economies with similar development levels and
conditions. Their finding supports the presumption that in most CEECs the actual
saving rates were above predicted or equilibrium levels. They explain this difference
with wide-ranging quantity and price controls that made consumers unable to choose an
optimal consumption path, resulting in disequilibrium savings. Last, we should add that
the gap between actual and equilibrium levels of savings changed over time. Reform
efforts of the 1970s and 1980s reduced somewhat the distortions, while strengthening
16
trade and financial links with Western market economies made the control of
consumption by the authorities less effective.
3.1.2. In the early phase of transition to market economy: the collapse
As transition to the market economy began, bringing about far-reaching changes
in the political and economic systems of the CEECs, very often in association with the
radical elimination of administrative (price) controls, savings declined sharply in almost
all of the transition countries. This fall in the saving ratio that ran parallel to the
dramatic contraction in output and soaring inflation may be interpreted as a necessary
adjustment to eliminate the inherited disequilibrium. However, we can see later on that
the contraction of both in savings and general economic conditions proved so significant
and long-lasting that this development can only to some extent be considered to have
been a sort of creative destruction. On average it took four to five years, of course
depending on countries, to reach the bottom in contraction. On Figure 3 we can see that
the annual rate of fall in GDP in a few countries sometimes reached 10-35% in the early
1990s. At the same time price developments following the liberalization of prices led to
two to four digit annual inflation rates in this period (see Figure 4 and Table 1).
Figure 4
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Table 1
Inflation in the CEECs
(annual average percentage change in consumer prices)
Group 1998 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Czech
Republic
1.4 9.7 52 11.1 20.8 10 9.1 8.8 8.5 10.7 2.1 3.9
Estonia 6.1 23.1 211 1076 89.8 47.7 29 23.1 11.2 8.2 3.3 3.8
Hungary 17 28.9 35 23 22.5 18.8 28.2 23.6 18.3 14.3 10.1 9.5
Poland 251 586 70.3 43 35.3 32.2 27.8 19.9 14.9 11.8 7.3 9.9
Slovenia 1306 550 118 207 32.9 21 13.5 9.9 8.4 8 6.1 8.6
Group 2000 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Bulgaria 6.4 26.3 334 82 73 96.3 62 123 1082 22.2 0.7 7
Latvia 4.7 10.5 172 951 109 35.9 25 17.6 8.4 4.7 2.4 2.9
Lithuania 2.1 8.4 225 1021 410 72.1 39.6 24.6 8.9 5.1 0.8 1
Romania 1.1 5.1 170 210 256 137 32.3 38.8 154 59.1 45.8 45
Slovak
Republic
2.3 10.8 61.2 10 23.2 13.4 9.9 5.8 6.1 6.7 10.6 11.9
Source: EBRD, 2000.
Investments on a decline
Although investments and the ratio of capital formation to GDP also decreased
in all CEECs, the rate of contraction in most cases fell short of the drop in savings,
except some countries such as Latvia or Lithuania. Despite economic recession this
drop in savings increasingly resulted in current account imbalances (see Figure 6). One
can observe, however, that the investment ratio in many CEECs began decreasing back
in the 1980s, thus even before the collapse of the communist regimes (see e.g.
Temprano, 1995). Worsening efficiency of investments that produced growth results
much under expectations may be one of the reasons behind that. It should be noted here
that the first some years of transition were characterized by outstandingly high
accumulation of inventories in some countries. It took some time to depreciate
unsaleable goods or sell them at unreasonably low prices. That is one reason why gross
18
investment rates fell less than saving rates, however, this was not the case for gross
fixed capital formation (GFCF). Furthermore, it took some years on the one hand, to
redirect trade from CMEA (and feeble domestic) markets towards Western markets, and
on the other hand, to switch (create) production lines to more marketable products. The
turnaround in investment trends usually had come some years before economies as well
as saving rates reached the bottom. In those CEECs belonging to the group 1998 this
happened around 1992 or a year before or after that.
Figure 5
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Figure 6
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I should warn here that both gross investment and gross fixed investment ratios
should be treated with some caution. Not only because of unreliability of data, but
owing to methodological reasons. Investment ratios to GDP can grow in an expanding
economy if the growth rate of investment surpasses the rate of GDP growth. Similarly,
in a shrinking economy investment ratios can fall when the rate of GDP contraction is
below that of investments. As a consequence, investment ratios sometimes hide
opposite movements in the volume of real investments.
20
Taking into account both the investment ratio and the annual real change in
investments we can get the following picture. As far as investments are concerned,
Group 1998 countries had the worst years indeed around 1992. In the Czech Republic
(except between 1997-99) there have been no actual falls in fixed investments since
1992, only a slowdown in growth in 1993. In Estonia there was a fall around its
independence from the FSU (1991) and later on in 1999. In Hungary fixed investments
fell in the early 1990s and in 1995. Poland experienced actual falls in its investments in
1990-91, and although investment ratios indicated further decrease in 1992-93, in fact
fixed investments increased slightly, but below GDP growth rates. Slovenia suffered an
actual fall in its investments also only in the early 1990s (1992). At the same time the
other CEECs show rather mixed development. A common feature of their market
economy development has been that all of them have registered two periods of
decreasing investments: one in the early 1990s (except Romania), and the other one in
the second half of the decade (see it later). Scarce data on the composition of
investments indicate that both corporate and public investments fell early in the
transition. Worsening of profitability reduced the ability of enterprises to invest from
retained earnings, while increasing uncertainty related to transition and recession forced
them to postpone investment decisions. Public investment (including also a big number
of public enterprises at the start of transition) fell too, however, its ratio to GDP
remained comparable to those of the developed market economies.
Before turning to savings, one should again emphasize the need to interpret
figures with caution. In some years the difference between the same figures from
different sources can be rather significant, also national accounts statistics are often
revised up or downwards retrospectively, etc. Furthermore, I have checked the accuracy
of the figures supplied by international organizations (e.g. the World Bank, IMF,
OECD, EBRD) based on national statistics. Because of accounting principles the
difference between the gross saving ratio (GNS) and gross capital formation ratio (GCF)
should be reflected in current account balance (CA) as a percentage of GDP. However,
sometimes there are significant differences between those CA figures that are derived
residually from GNS and GCF, and those presented directly in balance of payments
statistics (and calculated by using other methods). Although some differences are
always present, such differences above a certain limit already raise the question to what
extent those statistics are reliable. That is the reason why some authors use only two
figures of the three and calculates the third one as a residual. (See e.g. Denizer and
Wolf, 1998, who calculated gross domestic savings ratios from current account and
gross domestic investment figures). Despite all of these shortcomings in statistics we
may still suppose that the main trends are correct. This presumption is also supported by
the fact that the statistics of all CEECs seem to demonstrate the same main trends.
Elimination of disequilibrium savings
One of the common features of post communist development of the CEECs has
been that without any exception, all have suffered a dramatic fall in their saving rates,
starting either in the late 1980s or early 1990s. On average the declining trend of saving
did last for four years, plus/minus some years. (See Figures 7 and 9) As a consequence,
saving ratios to GDP more than halved within a few years in the majority of countries,
and fell but less sharply in the other countries (the Czech and Slovak Republics and
Slovenia), as well. However, there seems to be no robust correlation between the
magnitudes of fall and the subsequent rebound. Some countries have suffered more
21
serious fall in their saving rates, however, the adjustment  eventually ended up in higher
saving rates than in the other countries with less radical fall (see e.g. Hungary, Latvia,
Romania and Slovenia). But this is by no means a strong regularity. Some analysts have
argued that those countries which suffered less dramatic falls in their saving rates could
not have eventually refrained from further decreasing and this has been mainly the
result of postponed or less radical (effective) structural adjustment. This holds some
truth (see e.g. the case of Romania), however, there are some countries (the most well-
known examples are the Czech and Slovak Republics) where saving ratios have never
decreased below "normal" (e.g. EU-15 average) level (25% and 22% respectively) in
the 1990s. Certainly, it is rather difficult to identify a normal or equilibrium level of
savings. Beside common factors it is influenced by idiosyncratic components and
individual characteristics as well, including policy choices and initial conditions. We
can find loose, in many cases even a negative correlation between saving rates and
growth, at least during the adjustment to equilibrium saving rates. (See Figure 9) This
relationship is in sharp contrast to what have been observed in the majority of countries
outside this region. But this is not quite surprising during large external shocks and
especially in the transition to market economy. And as the experience of the CEECs
does show us it takes a long time for market mechanisms to get working properly. Here
are some examples: In Hungary in the period 1994-96, despite definite rebound in
saving rates (by 10 percentage points or more) growth remained subdued or even
slowed somewhat. On the contrary, despite falling saving rates, (by more than 5
percentage points) in Romania recovery strengthened in 1994-95, etc. In the CEECs it is
also difficult to decide whether growth pulled up savings or vice versa, however, it
seems curtain  that in seven out of the 10 CEECs growth was restored the same year
when there was also a turnaround in saving trends. With only a few exceptions, in the
early phase of transition unmanageable external imbalances (i.e. current account
deficits) did not evolve. There are several reasons to explain this. In some countries not
only saving rates declined, but also investments. In the other countries pre-transition
levels of savings were so high, and much above investment rates, that a sharp reduction
in saving rates, only eroded former surpluses on the current account. Furthermore,
during the years of transition-related recession with unpredictable political
developments, high macroeconomic instability, deteriorating profitability of enterprises,
falling real incomes of households etc. effective demand remained limited for
investment goods. Also the inflow of foreign investments was more moderate as
compared to the following years.
22
Figure 7
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Figure 8
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Figure 9
Major macroeconomic indicators of savings and investments, the current acccount, and the growth of GDP
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Figure 9 (cont.)
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Figure 9 (cont.)

-20
-10
0
10
20
30
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
6RXUFH(%5',0),)6<HDUERRN

R
I
*
'
3
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
%
GFCF (% of GDP) GNS (%of GDP)
GDP (% growth, right sc.) CA (% of GDP)

-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
6RXUFH(%5',0),)6<HDUERRN

R
I
*
'
3
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
%
GFCF (% of GDP) GNS (%of GDP)
GDP (% growth, right sc.) CA (% of GDP)
27
Changing composition of GNS: household savings up - government and corporate
savings down
But how can we explain the falling trend of saving rates throughout the region?
Interestingly, not all the components of GNS fell in the early years of transition. The fall
was mainly due to reduced corporate savings, and to a lesser extent, worsening saving
position of the government sector. Contrary to this trend, household saving rates started
to recover from their low pre-transition levels. However, the pace proved not enough to
offset the declines in the other two sectors (see e.g. EBRD, 1996; Temprano, 1995).
In the first years of transition most CEECs suffered a sharp deterioration in
their government savings. They turned not only negative but many countries (except
e.g. the Czech Republic or Slovenia) ran to high general government deficits, the range
of which in some countries (see e.g. Hungary, Bulgaria) reached up to 6-8 per cent of
GDP. Even the better budget position of some Baltic states was the result of falling
public investments. Increasing public dissaving was the consequence of several factors
including drop in revenues due to output decline and large losses in state enterprises, as
well as persisting public spending due partly to rising unemployment. The decline in tax
revenues was usually not only the consequence of the recession and worsening
profitability of enterprises but, at least in the short run, of tax reforms and the expanding
"gray economy". Furthermore, in the early years of transition some CEECs (e.g. Poland,
Hungary, Bulgaria) suffered from serious external indebtedness, and servicing the debt
put for some time a heavy burden on these governments’ shoulders and limited
significantly their room for maneuvering. This indebtedness, including the debt
management schemes highly resemble what happened to Latin-American countries.
The structure of government expenditures also changed, capital expenditures fell
sharply in almost all of the countries. This was partly the result of the gradual
elimination of capital transfers to enterprises as well as the rationalization of
government investments. Certainly, it took some time for the governments to find and
shape their new role under the market economy. In the pre-transition period
governments used to undertake large investment projects, and owing to the big number
of industrial state-owned enterprises, not only in such sectors as infrastructure. As
privatization of state-owned enterprises progressed, the role of the governments
changed noticeably in investment decisions.  Under these circumstances it seems not so
surprising that government investments fell considerably throughout the region.
Although no comprehensive figures are available on saving rates of the
corporate sector in this period, scarce information on the profitability and cash-flow
position of the larger enterprises indicates that corporate savings fell sharply at least in
the early years of transition. During socialism, enterprises did constitute the main pillar
of the gross saving system, thus the subsequent deterioration in the corporate sector’s
financial (and hence saving) position, a decline in profitability, pulled down aggregate
saving, as well. This came as a consequence of large swings in relative prices, reduced
government subsidies, recession, collapse of the CMEA, increased competition and
soaring inflation, etc. That time the number of those enterprises coming close to become
bankrupt or at least getting in desperate financial situation increased sharply, many of
them were unable to pay for obligations to suppliers, workers or creditors.
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The ratio of household saving to GDP has increased almost unanimously across
the CEECs since transition began. Although no reliable statistics are available at
household level for all the CEECs, especially no complete time series, based on
information and data of some countries we may get an insight how household savings
developed during transition. In the pre-transition period household saving as a
percentage of disposable income was at very low level in the CEECs as compared to
most EU countries or other market economies. In those countries where these data are
available, household savings ranged between 3-8%  in the mid 1980s. (It should be
noted, however, that even for some OECD countries no reliable time series are available
for household savings and they are difficult to compare with each other due to different
methods used in compilation. /For more details, see e.g. OECD, 2000/. Nevertheless,
one can clearly see that even the developed market economies differ widely in respect to
this indicator.) Looking at available time series (see e.g. Temprano, 1995) one can see a
definitely increasing trend of household savings in the early years of transition, in many
countries to double digit rates (e.g. in Poland to over 20%). There are several possible
explanations behind this trend (a trend not maintained in the longer run, as we will show
it later). Some argue that the share of household income in GDP is likely to have risen
as enterprise profitability fell (EBRD, 1996). Temprano (1995) has pointed out that in
market economies much greater proportion of national income is distributed to
households and, therefore, a larger share of national saving can be accumulated there.
Thus, transition to a market economy by transferring to a significant extent of the
ownership of the national wealth from the state to the private sector should increase the
household saving rate. As was presented in the previous section, during socialism there
were neither ability (e.g. due to ownership restrictions and strict central control over
wages and income, limited choice of instruments) nor special motives for households to
increase permanently their saving levels. However, this was partly offset by forced
saving due to the shortage of consumer durables. It is supposed that forced saving, to
some extent, took the form of monetary overhangs. Since transition began, the saving
patterns of households have changed considerably. As for motives, the uncertainty
(over future income and social security, incl. public pension) increased  radically.
Jumping level of unemployment and soaring inflation were in sharp contrast to what
people got accustomed to. This raised precautionary motives for saving and the desire to
smooth consumption over the life-cycle, the main motives in a market economy. At the
same time high inflation seems to have eroded much of the real value of financial assets
of households. Although there are debates concerning the importance and magnitude of
monetary overhangs accumulated before transition, it is assumed that part of them was
eliminated in the first years after (and in some countries even before) transition and the
other part was eroded by inflation. As a result of market liberalization, the supply of
goods (incl. consumer durables) has improved in most countries, also it has become
increasingly possible to buy the products abroad. (In Hungary, for instance, the opening
of the frontier and easing of customs rules led to a sharp but temporary increase of one-
day buying tourism to the neighboring Austria where people bought the badly needed
durables such as refrigerator, video player, etc.)
Several other transition-related peculiarities can be mentioned that diverted
temporarily household saving rates form their long-run level. In the following we list
some of these. Despite increasing uncertainty, household saving rate turned even
negative in the former Czechoslovakia (also in Bulgaria) reflecting a boom in purchases
in anticipation of the price liberalization. In 1991 in Hungary the government created an
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incentive to accelerate repayments of mortgages with early-payment discount (see
EBRD, 1996). As a result, household saving recovered steeply that year but fell again
later on. Another interesting feature has been the sale of the state (self-government)
owned housing stock in the transition countries. Privatization of dwellings as well as
state-owned enterprises has increased the choice of saving instruments (both in real and
financial assets). The same results emerged by the new opportunity of setting-up new
businesses. Many of them were small, often family-owned enterprises. Forming these
small businesses was also encouraged by increasing unemployment. On the other hand,
it is assumed that a fall in corporate savings and investment (and a simultaneous
increase in household saving) to a considerable extent  stemmed from the peculiarities
of the statistical classification, i.e. investment by small ventures was counted as
household saving.
3.1.3. The stage of stabilization and restored growth
Around 1994 (some countries such as Poland, Slovenia, Romania before this
year, some others such as Estonia, Lithuania after that) CEECs started to get over their
transition related recession and achieved economic stabilization (see Figure 3). Despite
common features of the transition (i.e. deep recession at the beginning, a U turn in GDP
and saving/investment rates etc.) CEECs are rather different as for their initial
conditions, policy choices and the results. Although following several years of perpetual
contraction in GDP, growth has been restored in all of them, CEECs have proved very
different both as for the growth rate and its sustainability. Now, it may be worth
referring back to Figure 2, indicating the level of real GDP in 1999. Different positions
of the countries stem not only from different growth trends but the level to which they
fell back in the first years of transition. The dividing line between countries can be
drawn to what extent they have succeeded to develop market mechanisms and replace
destructive forces by building ones. It seems very important to note here that no strong
correlation can be found between the time when growth was restored and how far a
country has gone in market economy development. There is a big discrepancy across
the CEECs concerning both the speed and extent of economic reforms. By postponing
or at least mitigating painful economic adjustment both at macro and micro levels
countries could escape further output contraction (and ease social unrest), at least in the
short run. To some extent, this can be understood, since nowhere transition could be
completed at a one stroke, but in more stages building on each other, involving also
several setbacks and running-up to the most difficult tasks. Nevertheless, countries and
their governments have proved rather dissimilar in policy consistency and determination
towards market reforms. There seems to be less difference in basic reforms like price
and trade liberalization, but more in further steps such as privatization, corporate
governance, institution building, financial reforms etc., although these areas seem to be
the very ones determining whether a transition country gets on a sustainable growth
path. Although it is rather difficult to define when a country passes through the stage of
stabilization, the key question is whether recovery is strengthened and sustained in the
longer run. In the opposite case, countries either undergo a prolonged period of
stagnation or what is worse, cannot prevent further recession. One can cite several
examples for both. Stabilization involved also efforts to curb inflation, which was
indeed reduced in most countries, however, it has remained stubborn, in the majority of
CEECs well over single digit rates (see Table 1).
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Stabilization of savings: do they have definite direction?
Following a sharp adjustment at the beginning of transition saving rates started
to stabilize in the mid-1990s; GNS, both in real terms and as a percentage of GDP,
increased from very low levels. There were only few countries where, despite the
declining trend, the GNS to GDP ratio remained at more manageable levels and also
above EU-average. These CEECs are the Czech and Slovak Republics and Slovenia. In
the Czech Republic, as far as statistics are correct (there are some contradictions
between figures from different sources), the GNS ratio has never dropped below 25%
since the start of transition. In Slovakia GNS ratio moved also in the range 25-30% in
the second half of the 1990s, while in Slovenia it increased gradually from  the 20 some
percent low reached in 1995. To some extent this can be attributed to a more balanced
position of the government sector in these countries as compared to other CEECs
(although this may be less true for Slovakia). These countries were also among the less
indebted CEECs at the beginning of the transition (while in some countries such as
Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria the ratio of external debt exceeded half of GDP).
Furthermore, these countries may have followed a more cautious policy stance as for
price liberalization, large-scale privatization, structural adjustment, at least at the
beginning.
We should add that the CEECs have applied very different exchange rate
policies, as well. Due to inflation under better control (actually Slovenia could
efficiently reduce high inflation rate within a few years), neither the profitability of
enterprises nor the financial wealth of households eroded so dramatically as in other
countries with much more stubborn inflation rates. In some CEECs real wages
decreased for several years, or at least increased at a moderate pace (see e.g. Hungary,
Romania, Bulgaria). Other countries (e.g. the Czech Republic, Slovenia) followed
different a route: following a sharp initial reduction in the early 1990s real wages
improved definitely and almost continuously.
The recent OECD Outlook (No. 68/2000) presents household saving figures out
of the Eastern European member countries only for the Czech Republic. Since 1993 (the
year of split of Czechoslovakia), except a one year drop, the household savings rate has
increased continuously, from 6% in 1993 to 12% in 2000. This could partly offset the
increasing dissaving of the general government sector. But the trend of increasing
household saving has not been unanimous throughout the region. Take, for instance, the
case of Hungary. Figures on household saving ratio indicate considerable fluctuations
over time. First, it increased in the early 1990s to double digit levels (about 15% in
1991) offsetting to some extent the fall in corporate and government savings, however,
it fell back in 1993 and although fluctuated, remained mostly in the range 5-10%
afterwards. In recent years the household saving ratio has gradually decreased to an
estimated 6-7%. (EBRD, 1996; National Bank of Hungary, 2000/a-b; Várhegyi, 2000,
Árvai et al., 2001). Notwithstanding fluctuating and more moderate household savings,
gross savings of Hungary increased continuously since 1994. Gross savings to GDP in
Hungary increased from a low of about 11% in 1993 to some percentage points above
25% in 1997-98, but seems to have diminished again recently. Looking at figures of
general government balance (see Figure 5) one can say that the significant increase to a
large part could have been attributed to improving savings of the corporate sector. (For
development of the main components of gross savings in Hungary see Figure 10).
Poland also experienced a sharp fall in its GNS ratio to about 16.5% in 1993. Despite
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positive adjustments in saving in the subsequent years, GNS to GDP has stagnated since
then at a level only slightly above 20%. Contrary to expectations, despite high real
interest rates, the saving rate of households fell back in Poland by about 5 percentage
points to 3% in 1999 (see Árvai et al., 2001). Both in Hungary and Poland perceptible
improvement in income expectations as well as expanding credit flows to households
can be identified as important factors behind the recent decreasing trend of household
savings. Interestingly, despite its GNS ratio that stagnated and remained below those of
most other countries (at least in the Group 1998),  Poland produced by far the highest
average growth rates among the CEECs in the second half of the 1990s. This highlights
the previous finding that contrary to many other countries in the world during transition
the correlation between the GNS ratio and growth seems to be less robust (or even
negative). Only in an advanced stage of transition and following several years of
adjustment the co-movement of savings and growth starts to be more manifested (see
Figure 9). Following stabilization of domestic savings in 1995, Estonia has succeeded
to increase its GNS ratio since 1997. According to IMF figures (based on available
national accounts statistics), the GNS to GDP ratio increased to above 20% in 1999.
Although national statistics (Bank of Estonia, 2000) indicate GNS over 20% of GDP
only in some quarters of 1998 and 1999, the trend of moderately increasing savings can
be identified. According to the Bank of Estonia, the recent trend has been due to cutting
current expenditure in the public sector as well as higher profitability of the business
sector as a result of discovering new markets. The GNS ratio of Slovakia has remained
among the highest in the CEECs (close to 27-28% in recent years). Interestingly,
although Slovakia kept its saving rates high, growth slowed down in most recent years.
Romania stopped the falling trend of domestic savings at 20 and some per cent of GDP
in the early 1990s, but following a period of apparent stabilization, the GNS ratio started
to fall back again, beginning in 1994-95. As far as the recent IMF figure for 1999 is
correct (IMF, 2000), Latvia managed to raise its national saving rate to 21% of GDP by
1999. (Note: Figures from other sources (such as UN ECE, 2001) do not confirm this
favorable trend). However, neither Bulgaria, nor the third Baltic state, Lithuania could
have moved their savings far from the very low level achieved in the mid 1990s.
Figure 10
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Government dissaving pulls down GNS in several countries
As far as government savings/dissavings are concerned, apart from some
countries where budgets have been more or less in balance throughout the 1990s (e.g.
the Czech Republic up to 1999; Estonia except in 1999; Slovenia) most other CEECs
produced large general government deficits with severe repercussion on their gross
saving rates, especially countries such as Hungary, Bulgaria (up to 1997), and
Lithuania. However, no clear-cut trends can be distinguished in this respect. Hungary,
for instance, despite restored growth and efforts to cut current spending, could not have
managed to reduce its persisting general government deficit (over several years
exceeding 6% of GDP) owing to large and increasing deficits on social security and
health funds, and to some extent the heavy burden of debt servicing. Also in Poland,
following some years with smaller deficit, general government deficit seems to have got
stuck at a level about 3% of GDP. Some countries, like Romania or Slovakia, that
achieved good results in deficit reduction in the first half of the 1990s, suffered from a
rebound in deficit subsequently. Bulgaria, following a successful but late stabilization,
and as a result of austerity measures has managed to put its general government finances
largely in balance since 1997.
Divergent investment trends in the region
The CEECs differ widely in the timing of the turnaround in investment
performance. Most of the countries in Group 1998 started to lift investment rates from
the bottom reached in the early 1990s, around 1993 or a year before.  All of them have
managed to increase investment rate to levels that can constitute a solid basis for long-
run growth. Economic restructuring, the replacement of obsolete capital stocks, keeping
up with technological development world-wide that seem to be a precondition for long-
run sustainable growth in the CEECs require huge capital investments. Without any
doubt, the CEECs at much lower level of economic development in order to catch-up
should reach and maintain investment rates well above those of most advanced market
economies, including EU countries. As the recent EBRD Transition Report points out
(EBRD, 2000), in the initial phase of transition, growth was hardly driven by capital
investment since the available capital stock was already large. Due to over-investment
in the pre-transition period and dramatic contraction of output, for some time capital
(stock) to output ratio was rather high in the CEECs (especially in the Baltic states) as
compared to developed market economies. Because of large existing capital stocks
depreciation requirements are also high. Only in the most advanced CEECs, where
efficiency of capital allocation has improved considerably, capital output ratio seems to
have stabilized recently. Neither in the Czech Republic nor Estonia the GFCF ratio
actually fell below 25%, but recovered to new highs, in some years exceeding 30%  of
GDP. Slovakia has never gone through a radical fall in its investment rates (comparable
to other transition countries), but its rates were boosted to record highs (close to 40%), a
level rarely seen in Europe. By contrary, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia  reached bottom
in the early 1990s, at a level between 15-20%. However, all of them could have
gradually increased their investment rates to new highs by the end of the decade, a level
well above EU-15 average. The other countries show rather mixed development of
investment. Although statistics are scarce, based on IMF figure for 1999, Latvia seems
to have managed to lift investments from their mid-90s low. While  Lithuania has
increased its GFCF ratio from the dangerous low under 10% of GDP to over 20% since
the mid-1990s, it seems to have been unable to lead further up. Also the trend shows
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considerable fluctuations over time. Both Bulgaria and Romania have shown a rather
negative trend in investments. Starting from the late 1980s Bulgaria suffered  a dramatic
and continuous fall in its GFCF. It has succeeded to improve its rather weak investment
performance since 1997 only, parallel to the results achieved in overcoming its deep
macroeconomic crisis. Although Romania maintained an investment rate much higher
than in most other CEECs well into transition, it could not escape a further decline.
Actually, contrary to trends of most CEECs, the investment ratio of Romania has
decreased almost continuously since 1993, to a level, which is the second lowest only to
Bulgaria.
The other side of the coin: worsening external imbalances
When looking at Figure 6, we can see that external disequilibrium has worsened
throughout the region as transition proceeded. In the early years of transition, except
some extraordinary cases, due to recessionary trends and depressed domestic demand,
current account remained either balanced or had a deficit at more manageable level.
However, as growth was restored and recovery got a new momentum current account
deficits increased considerably. Although some countries have managed to improve
their export performance due to favorable structural changes in the export sector and
better market access, imports have increased everywhere as a consequence of brisk
domestic demand and high import intensity of production in some countries. In the last
some years even those CEECs run deficits on current account which had had surpluses
before. In the second half of the 1990s several transition countries suffered from current
account deficits in the range 5-10% of GDP. All of the Baltic states belong to this
group, some of them (most notably Lithuania) having had deficits above 10% of GDP
over a longer period of time. Of the more advanced CEECs, Hungary had current
account deficits over 9% of GDP both in 1993 and 1994, that together with
unmanageable general government deficits forced the Hungarian government to
introduce austerity and stabilization measures. Also the Czech Republic had to make
corrections as a consequence of increasing external disequilibrium and the currency
crisis that affected the Czech koruna in 1996-97. In early 1997 the Czech government
introduced two packages of austerity measures and adopted a managed float exchange
rate regime to replace the former fixed exchange rate system, a change that resulted in a
significant real appreciation of the koruna. By now Slovenia could have kept its current
balance under control. For a long period of time Poland also could, but one can observe
a continuously worsening current account position in the second half of the 1990s. Of
the other CEECs mainly the Baltic states have produced large, and in the long-run
hardly sustainable current account deficits. These countries suffered much also from the
Russian crisis in 1998-1999 that reduced sharply their export market and produced some
uncertainty among foreign investors. In the recent two years, due to austerity measures
(including an import surcharge), Slovakia has managed to pull back current account
deficits from a level about 10% of GDP in 1996-98.
Taking the issue of current account balances from an other point of view, the
widening disequilibrium indicates divergent movement of saving and investment rates.
We can see that although in most CEECs saving rate has recovered from their post
recession low, its growth rate has in several cases fallen short of that of investments (see
e.g. Slovakia, Poland), or has been not high enough to narrow significantly the gap (see
e.g. Lithuania). In some countries widening current account deficit can be attributed not
to slow growth of national savings (as compared to investment), but actually to its
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declining trend (see e.g. Romania). The gap between GNS and GCF ratios must have
been financed by the inflow of foreign capital (foreign savings). The widening gap
between domestic savings and investments can for a longer period of time be
maintained only if an increasing inflow of foreign capital fills it. Although better access
to foreign saving can ease the constraint of domestic saving on investment, thus can
favorably contribute to speed up transition and catching-up, the vulnerability of
countries also increases. The degree of vulnerability depends, among other things, on
the current account deficit as a percentage of GDP, the weight of foreign capital in the
host economy, as well as its composition (i.e. FDI and portfolio investment, long-term
and short-term capital investments). High sensitivity to sudden removal of foreign
capital inflow and its fluctuations (as has amply been demonstrated by some cases in
the region, and also in connection with the Mexican and Asian crises) can only be
reduced by increasing macroeconomic stability and lifting national savings more close
to investments.
3.1.4. Putting the economy on a sustained growth track - towards EU
membership
Although all the ten CEECs have already had Europe (or Association)
Agreements with the EU for several years (and before that trade and co-operation
agreements dating back to early transition) they have begun official negotiations for EU
membership only recently, either in 1998 or 2000. These countries must have undergone
a profound transformation during transition to be able to meet challenges they are
expected to face in the EU. However, the requirements against a candidate seem to be
much higher now than some decades ago when other less developed countries joined the
EU. Since pre-accession transfers from the EU by now has remained below
requirements associated not only with preparation for joining to the EU but market
economy transition, CEECs have been forced to provide for the necessary finances both
by increasing the inflow of foreign capital and higher domestic savings. Looking at
countries taking part in former enlargements of the EU we can find several similarities
between those and the recent candidates. Here I would refer to some of them. For me
Slovakia’s development in the 1990s, for instance, is resembling to that of Portugal, at
least in a quantitative sense, as in both countries sustained high investment rates have
boosted growth, although quality differences behind the figures cannot be neglected. At
the same time, some similarities can also be found between Hungary and Ireland, or
Poland and Spain, at least in respect to the way and extent foreign (direct) investment
has contributed to improvements in the export sector, etc. Much of the economic
reforms in candidate countries should have been carried out even without applying for
EU membership. A lot of obligations (e.g. trade liberalization) are related to
membership in international organizations like WTO, IMF, (OECD) etc. Nevertheless,
the ultimate goal of eventual EU membership has encouraged (and forced) countries to
progress with far-reaching but sometimes painful reforms that can constitute a solid
basis of sustainable growth, but also has offered convincing arguments why to do this at
much higher speed (and in some fields in a more profound way) than otherwise would
have been required.
Indeed, we can observe a definitely improving trend in the recent
macroeconomic development of most CEECs. Preliminary data suggest that all of the
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candidate countries have achieved positive growth by 2000, many of them higher than
the EU-15 average (an estimated 3.5% in 2000). There are few exceptions. One of them
is the Czech Republic where growth has just been restored following macroeconomic
corrections of the previous years (see Figure 3). In three other CEECs GDP growth rate
fell short of EU average. Following a recession in 1999 which was related to a large part
to the Russian crisis, Lithuania restored growth in 2000. Positive growth in Romania
that was registered in 2000, came after several years of recession and due to adjustment
programs supported by the IMF and the World Bank. Slovakia seems to be in another
phase of growth than the other CEECs. Here the austerity measures introduced in mid
1999 to reduce current account and fiscal deficits pulled  economic growth back from
rates above 5% which the country had enjoyed for several years.
Annual inflation has been reduced in most CEECs close to or under 10%, in
some countries even under 5% (see table 1 and Figure 4). To this segment do belong
most countries, including all of the Baltic states and Bulgaria. Romania has yet been
struggling with high double digit inflation rates, whereas in Slovakia inflation has
recently rebounded again partly due to switch over floating exchange rates.
Preliminary data suggest that by 2000 general government deficits of the
candidate countries have been reduced below 4% of GDP (see Figure 5). The only
notable exception is the Czech Republic, where both fiscal deficits and public debt are
on an increase. As for external equilibrium, current account deficits have been kept
under control in several but not all countries (see Figure 6). As argued, the deficit can
be maintained in longer-run during transition and it can have favorable impact on
growth, however, above a certain limit it can endanger macroeconomic stability. Those
countries having run current account deficits above approximately 5% of GDP in longer
period of time should carefully monitor these developments and make the necessary
steps to put it under control in time. In 2000 especially Lithuania, Estonia and Poland
had to face this risk. Since the stabilization stage of transition several CEECs have been
forced to decelerate growth by introducing some kind of adjustment measures. This
indicates that although growth has been restored in all the CEECs, many countries have
proved unable to sustain it in the longer run. This highlights again the importance of
sound macroeconomic foundations, development of institutions and coordinated
policies.
As for national savings, the GNS to GDP ratio has increased to levels in the
range 25-30% in four of the ten CEECs, namely the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary
and Slovenia. This level is well above the EU-15 average of 21 per cent in 1999 and is
comparable only to that of Ireland and Finland among member countries. This level of
domestic savings, if sustained, can constitute a solid foundation for long-run growth and
catching-up without too dangerous level of reliance on (often volatile) foreign savings.
Of the other CEECs Poland, Estonia and, as far as the IMF figure is correct, Latvia have
also achieved saving rates above 20% (close to the EU-15 average), however, because
previously all of them have had much higher investment rates current account
imbalances have persisted. By the end of the 1990s there have been three candidate
countries, namely Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania, where savings have remained
rather low both as compared to the EU-15 average or other CEECs, and  their own
investment rates. They have all suffered from lenient (even negative) growth and
usually considerable current account imbalances, as well.
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Let’s turn our attention to investment rates of the CEECs (see  Figure 8). We can
see that all of them but Bulgaria having had at least the same (Romania) or much higher
GFCF ratios than the EU-15 average (approximately 20% of GDP) reflecting the strong
need for new investments during transition. As argued, neither transition to market
economy nor catching-up to the EU can be realized without maintaining a relatively
high rate of investment in longer period of time. The point is whether these high rates of
GCF are sustainable in the CEECs and in what ways can they be financed. Sustaining
high rate of investment is a necessary condition but not sufficient for successful
catching up. Much depends on the "quality aspects" of investment, that is how
efficiently they are used and in what sectors. Beside physical forms of investment,
investments in human capital (e.g. education) and knowledge (e.g. R&D) are not less
important, since these are the factors that strongly determine the international
competitiveness of countries (and firms) in our age and are shaping absorptive capacity
as well as the efficiency by which capital is attracted and allocated.
3.2. Determinants of saving and growth in the CEECs
The experience of developed and developing countries alike has clearly
demonstrated that sustained high rates of investment and growth cannot be achieved
without strong domestic savings. Thus in this section I will examine how some of the
most important determinants of saving have been developing recently in the candidate
countries.
3.2.1. Domestic savings
3.2.1.1. Improving intermediation: financial liberalization and banking reform
World-wide experience and several empirical studies (see section 2) show little
or even negative direct effect of financial sector liberalization on overall and private
savings but point out to positive indirect effects via better growth potential.
Nevertheless, since the topic of my recent paper is growth and not savings as such in a
narrow sense, it seems useful to give a short overview how far CEECs have gone in this
field. Obviously, in non of the CEECs a clear-cut picture emerges from the very mixed
effects of financial sector reform on saving. On the one hand, by relaxing borrowing
constraints (both for companies and households) and usually increasing real interest
rates it is likely to have a negative effect. However, by improving the intermediation
from saving to productive investment it clearly has a positive impact on growth.
Furthermore, it increases the variety of saving instruments as well. The recent Asian
crisis has highlighted the importance of proper allocation of savings among economic
sectors, and prudent regulation and surveillance mechanism to control undesirable
destabilization effects. CEECs still have much to go towards this direction. In the early
phases of transition all countries had to face constraints stemming from the operation of
an inefficient banking sector. Although most of the CEECs introduced a two-tier
banking system in the early phase of transition, they were saddled with bad loans and
controlled largely by the state. Under-capitalization, shortage in professionals with
adequate credit-risk assessment skills, lack of competition, etc. led to poor efficiency in
the allocation of savings. For many years non-performing loans were often rolled-over
to large, loss-making state-owned enterprises (see e.g. Temprano, 1995). Furthermore,
37
small and medium-sized enterprises, new but promising private ventures have got
hardly access to bank financing: a problem that is still alive throughout the region.
Under these circumstances restructuring of the banking sector has had favorable long-
run impacts on growth. Several types of strategies have been applied to deal with
banking crises: most CEECs have generally pursued extensive restructuring and
recapitalization of the banks, while the Baltic states have usually carried out a
combination of liquidation and restructuring. Although the former (bailing out) strategy
incurred higher fiscal costs, ended up with sounder, more efficient banking systems (see
e.g. Claessens, 1996; Tang et al., 2000). Furthermore, many of the recapitalized banks
have been privatized to strategic foreign investors. All these strategies were
complemented with a new entry approach, as well. By 1999 in Hungary, Poland, Latvia
and Romania more than half of their banks were operating as partly or fully foreign-
owned. Taking into account its time- consuming character and vast fiscal costs, it is not
by chance that most CEECs have made progress in their banking reform only since the
second half of the 1990s. That is why these countries are still less advanced in this area
as compared to trade and price liberalization or privatization, as indicated also by the
EBRD transition indicators (see EBRD, 2000 and Figure 12). Some countries have
proved more successful and have progressed with banking reform in time. But some
others postponed the necessary measures at least until getting on the verge of financial
crisis. Here are some examples: Bulgaria was forced to speed-up  banking reforms in
1997 due to its financial crisis. Since 1997 privatization of the banks has progressed
leaving only the State Savings Bank in public ownership. However, credit ratio to the
private sector remains low since banks continue to hold government bonds instead of
extending commercial loans. Romania began privatization of its state banks only in
1999 amid financial turbulence. Financial crisis led to the closure of Bancorex, the
biggest loss-making bank, the collapse of the largest investment fund and put pressure
on unregulated credit cooperatives. In countries that are more advanced in banking
reform and privatization, the governments have usually retained controlling stakes only
in few banks (e.g. in Poland in two  large banks, PKO Bank Polski and BGZ the
agriculture bank; following the sale of Optiva Bank the government of Estonia has no
more controlling shares in the banking sector, etc.). Due to consolidation and
liquidation, the number of banks has decreased considerably throughout the region (see
Table 2). As it is depicted on Figure 12, countries that started negotiations with the EU
in 1998 have gone ahead of other countries in the region in both bank sector and non-
banking institutions’ reform. Among them Hungary and Estonia are leading the row.
Also the Baltic states seem to be more advanced in financial sector development. Asset
share of state-owned banks is low (under 10%) only in some countries (Hungary,
Estonia and Latvia), in many other countries state ownership still dominates. As for the
operational efficiency, we can get a rough picture from the estimates on the share of bad
loans. Some countries such as the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia are still
suffering from the high share of non-performing loans. Even IMF admits that while
macroeconomic stability had to be secured before countries could proceed effectively
with both enterprise and financial sector reforms, these reforms can also be considered
as pre-condition for sustaining stability (see IMF, 2000, p. 120.). Although the core
elements of a proper legal and regulatory framework for the banking sector were put in
place in most candidate countries, implementation and enforcement problems remain
widespread. Prudential bank regulations in the CEECs are largely aligned with EU’s
directives, however, according to some views candidate countries may overshoot those
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directives, at least until the transition process is completed (see e.g. Talley et al., 1998).
They argue that EU banking directives were designed for more stable economies and for
banking systems less vulnerable to reversals in capital flows. The extent of
intermediation in terms of credit extended to the private sector is still more limited, in
this respect CEECs differ widely both as compared to each other and to the EU (see
Table 2). Of the CEECs only the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia have a share of
such credits over 35% of GDP, i.e. comparable to market economies at similar level of
development. In all other countries domestic credit allocation to the enterprise sector is
rather limited that obviously puts an obstacle to corporate investment. The rather low
shares in many CEECs are comparable to those of Latin-American countries during the
debt crisis of the 1980s suffering from high inflation and strong monetary tightening.
Also the broad money-to-GDP ratio, an indicator of financial deepening (that is
supposed to have some links to savings, see section 2.2.) is generally lower in the
CEECs than in EU countries, except the Czech and Slovak Republics where it may
reflect banking sector problems (see table 2).
Figure 11
	
		
		
 !" #!	$%%&'







      
6RXUFH2ZQFDOFXODW LRQVEDVHGRQ(%5'ILJXUHV IRUPHWKRGRORJ\VHHWH[W 
  	  
	
		
		
 !"#!	()))'







      
6RXUFH2ZQFDOFXODWLRQVEDVHGRQ(%5'ILJXUHVIRUPHWKRGRORJ\VHHWH[W
	    
39
Figure 12









,Q
G
L
F
H
V

LQ





&= (67 +8 32/ 6/ %8 /$7 /,7 52 6$
1RWH3RLQWV
6RXUFH(%5' 
*
(%5'LQGH[RIEDQNLQJVHFWRUUHIRUP
(%5'LQGH[RIUHIRUPRIQRQEDQNLQJ ILQDQFLDO LQVW LWXW LRQV
Following the Asian financial crisis even the IMF has raised some concerns as
regard to too much progress in capital account liberalization in the CEECs while the
financial sector is in less than full health (see IMF, 2000, p. 143.). Development of the
non-bank financial institutions, including insurance companies and securities markets,
has long been even more limited, however, there have been some promising signs of
recent improvement in most countries. There are only few stock markets in the region
with sufficient capitalization and liquidity. Some of them have already overtaken the
smaller EU markets in terms of market capitalization and trading volumes. There are
some signs for increased regional co-operation and integration among markets (see
EBRD, 2000). Some countries still suffer from lack of enforcement regulations,
inadequate financial disclosure, and insufficient transparency of trading. Stock market
capitalization is among the highest in Estonia, Hungary followed by the Czech Republic
and Poland (see Table 2). All in all, financial sector reform seems to have considerable
fiscal costs already in the short run, but in the longer run it can reduce the costs of
financing investment and offer a much wider range of financing instruments to mobilize
savings. (For more details on the emergence of alternative saving instruments such as
pension funds, portfolio investments, etc. see also in sections 3.2.1.4. and 3.2.2.)
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Table 2
Indicators for financial sector development (1999)
Czech R. Estonia Hungary Poland Slovenia Bulgaria Latvia Lithuania Romania Slovakia
Number of banks (of which foreign owned) 42/17 7/2 39/27 77/39 31/5 28/7(*97) 23/12 13/4 34/19 25/10
Asset share of state-owned banks (%) 23.2 7.9 9.1 25 41.7 66 (*97) 8.5 (*98) 41.9 50.3 50.7
Bad loans (in percent of total) 31.4 3.1 2.8 14.5 10.2 12.9 (*97) 6.3 (*98) 11.9 36.6 40
Domestic credit to enterprises (% of GDP) 43.8 26.3 20.6 18.8 35.9 14.6 16.7 10.1 10.5 37.8
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP) 23.1 37.1 35.7 20 11.9 6 6.3 10.7 3.1 3.8
Broad money (% of GDP) 77 39 45 43 33 30 37 21 23 68
EBRD index of banking sector reform* 3.3 3.7 4 3.3 3.3 2.7 3 3 2.7 2.7
EBRD index of reform of non-bank.fin.inst.* 3 3 3.3 3.3 2.7 2 2.3 2.7 2 2.3
*) Points between 1-4
Source: (EBRD, 2000), (IMF, 2000).
41
3.2.1.2. Corporate savings and increasing profitability
Although no detailed statistics are available for corporate savings in the CEECs,
it is deducible from indirect information that most of the improvement in gross national
saving that has been observable since the second phase of transition can be attributed to
an increase in savings of the enterprises. At the beginning of the transition it was just
the sharp fall in corporate savings that was responsible for the dramatic collapse of GNS
in the CEECs. Due to several factors including market loss, high inflation, wide-spread
liquidity problems, increasing competition etc. many enterprises got in trouble. To
tackle these problems transition countries have been forced to progress with corporate
restructuring.
This, among others, necessitated to allow non-viable firms accumulating large
debts to go bankrupt. However, CEECs differ widely both in the timing and strictness of
bankruptcy laws that have been adopted. Some countries were relatively fast in this field
by enacting bankruptcy laws back in the early phase of transition (e.g. Hungary, Czech
Republic, Slovakia /1991/, Estonia, Lithuania /1992/), but most of them amended it or
replaced with new laws in subsequent years. Bulgaria, Slovenia /1994/, Romania /1995/
and Latvia /1996/ were latecomers in this aspect of transition. Of the candidate countries
EBRD has identified Bulgaria and Romania where corporate governance and
restructuring have remained a major reform backlog in transition (EBRD, 2000).
Despite laws being in force, several CEECs have been slow in progress with bankruptcy
proceedings, either due to inefficient enacting clauses or overburdening of the courts.
Depending on countries, governments spent a large, but usually decreasing amount of
budgetary subsidies to keep major firms in strategic sectors alive, this amount reaching
in a few cases some per cents of GDP. Certainly, the so-called market-cleaning is one of
the most awkward fields of transition. It brought about a sharp rise in unemployment
throughout the region.
As another way of responding to the lack of necessary financing and taking
efficiency considerations seriously, CEECs carried out privatization of their state-owned
enterprises. By now, with some exceptions, CEECs have carried out probably the most
ambitious privatization schemes over the world. Some governments have been more
reluctant or moderate in divesting themselves of state assets. Candidate countries have
applied rather different privatization methods (e.g. direct sales to strategic investors,
management buy-outs,  vouchers etc.). A common feature of the transition process in
the CEECs has been that small-scale privatization has been carried out at much faster
pace than selling of large state-owned enterprises (see e.g. the development of EBRD
privatization indices). Liquidation of insolvent enterprises, privatization and setting-up
new firms have all contributed to progress with economic restructuring to produce more
marketable products and services. However, no privatization per se can be considered
as a guarantee for successful restructuring, it is influenced by many factors. Shifting of
exports to Western markets, production lines to marketable goods, recovery of long-
depressed domestic markets have all improved the profitability of enterprises. Balance
sheets of (large) enterprises indicate a definitely improving profitability, at least in the
more advanced candidate countries.  It makes possible for a large (and ever increasing)
segment of enterprises to invest from retained earnings (own saving), the cheapest form
of financing investments. Furthermore, restructuring and recapitalization of the banking
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sector and development of non-bank financial institutions, including capital markets
have improved access of companies to external financing (external saving). It should be
noted, however, that the development of the financial sector (including securities
markets) is rather uneven in some CEECs and there are large discrepancies across
countries. In the less advanced CEECs both the number of companies traded on stock
exchanges and the trade volumes are extremely low. The local capital (including bond)
markets do not serve as a source of capital for most enterprises, particularly not for
small and medium-sized ones. In most of the CEECs there are only some dozens of
firms (mainly foreign-owned blue-chip companies) that have good access to both
domestic and external financing instruments. Some of them have successfully appeared
also on the corporate Eurobond market.
3.2.1.3. Public (dis)savings and burden of social security
As discussed in more details in section 3.1. fiscal imbalances (public dissavings)
have persisted in the CEECs since the start of transition. In the early phase it was
mainly due to a fall in revenues because of declining output, tax reforms, inefficient tax
collection as well as high expenditure associated with rising unemployment, structural
reform measures, in some cases also rising interest payments on debt, etc. On Figure 5
we can also see that by 2000 general government deficits have decreased in the CEECs,
however, with few exceptions have remained in the range 2-4 per cent of GDP. This is
further complicated by the non-transparent and quasi-fiscal nature of much government
spending, often associated with  implicit subsidies for existing enterprises (IMF, 2000).
In the Czech Republic, for instance, to get a clear-cut picture the official budget deficit
must be adjusted to cover the deficits of off-budget entities (primarily the Consolidation
Bank) and official public debt for the expanding state guarantees (see e.g. EBRD,
2000). Although in most CEECs decreasing somewhat, the size of the government (as
measured by revenue and expenditure ratios to GDP) has remained generally larger in
the CEECs than in many other market economies at similar levels of income. It should
be noted, however, that public sectors of the candidate countries on average have
roughly the same size as their counterparts in the EU. From the European point of view
the difference is not striking at all, hence most EU countries also have general
government expenditure ratios over 40 per cent of GDP. Furthermore, as the Wagner’s
law states, government expenditure as a share of GDP tends to rise with per capita
income, reflecting income-elastic demand for key government services. However, there
are significant differences across countries in the structure of government expenditures.
In most of the CEECs both current expenditures, including social assistance and
government consumption, and government transfers are relatively large. On the other
hand, the revenue structure in the CEECs may reflect their development level. There are
some differences across countries, especially in direct taxation of profits and personal
income, but on average the structure of revenue seems to be resembling those of most
EU countries. In 1999 the highest marginal personal income tax rates of the CEECs
were in the range 25% (Latvia) to 45% (Romania), while the profit tax rates fluctuated
across countries between 18% (Hungary) and 40% (Slovakia) (see World Bank,
2000/2001). Profit and personal income taxes, together with social security
contributions, on average amount to approximately 22% of GDP in the CEECs (counted
without Bulgaria and Romania, see EBRD, 2000, p. 55). Preparations for EU accession
and NATO membership for some CEECs mean some further pressures on their budget
(for more details see section 4). At the same time ageing of the population, high and
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even increasing deficits of the health and pension funds in several candidate countries
necessitate to speed-up reforms of the inherited, quite generous, social security systems,
a crucial element to restore fiscal balance, discussed separately in the following
section. These reforms seem to be even more inevitable to put fiscal imbalances under
control, otherwise further cuts in current expenditures and/or raising of taxes will be
needed, and both of these measures can undermine economic development by
worsening the quality and scope of basic government services and lowering
entrepreneurial spirit.
Moreover, fiscal imbalances may increase macroeconomic vulnerability, and to
some extent public borrowing can crowed out private investment and thus reduce
growth. We can get a rough picture on the importance of public deficits in creating gaps
between gross national saving and investment ratios by calculating gaps between
private saving and private investment. Similarly to what has been done by the EBRD
(see EBRD, 2000) I have made calculations based on the difference between current
account deficit and general government deficit for the CEECs (see Figure 11). Looking
at the recent two years (1999-2000) one can see that all of the candidate countries have
run general government deficits. However, there have been only two countries of the ten
CEECs where private saving has exceeded private investment, the Czech Republic and
Hungary, in these countries current account deficits seem to have been entirely the
consequence of fiscal imbalances. In other countries negative budget balances have
further widened the gap developed between private saving and investment.
3.2.1.4. Urbanization, ageing and pension reforms
There is no general agreement among researchers whether the urbanization ratio
has a positive and significant relationship with gross national saving (see section 2.2.).
Without attaching too much importance to it, I would like here only to show some
statistics. There are considerable discrepancies across countries in this respect: of the
CEECs other than the Baltic Republics, the Czech Republic represents the upper (75%)
and Romania (55%) the lower end in the row. The impact of demographic trends on
savings seems much more important. Most analytical papers agree that an increase in
both young and old dependency ratios has a significantly negative effect on saving.
From this point of view the average trend is negative in the region, similarly to several
developed countries in Europe and elsewhere. Of the ten CEECs there are only two
countries, namely Poland and the Slovak Republic where the number of population was
maintained or even increased over the last five years. All the other CEECs are still
struggling with a continuous decrease in population. The most dramatic fall has been
observable in Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia (i.e. in countries where there was a
noticeable emigration of ethnic minorities to the neighboring countries). As ageing of
the population has become the trend throughout the CEECs, and owing to generosity of
the former social security systems, unfunded pay-as-you-go (PAYG) state pension
schemes have become financially unsustainable in the long run. In the course of the
1990s the reform of the old-age security systems inherited from the socialist past
became ever urgent. (For a thorough analysis of this topic see e.g. Müller, 2000; EBRD,
1996/2000; Vittas, 1996). During socialism, a unified old-age security system was
created and integrated into the state budget, thereby cross-subsidizing other expenditure
items. In this system pensions tended to depend on the years of service rather than on
the level of contributions. Beside ageing of the population and inherited generosity of
the system (e.g. relatively high replacement rate /i.e. pension-wage ratio/, low
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retirement age, etc.) some new factors put also a strain on the sustainability of the
system. Since the start of transition the number and rate of employed has decreased.
Furthermore, due to a noticeable increase in the number of disability pensions and early
retirement schemes (as a substitute for welfare and unemployment benefits) dependency
ratios have deteriorated considerably. More precisely it means that currently in all the
CEECs there are less than two contributors per one pensioner. These ratios are similar
to the ones in the EU. Furthermore, some countries are struggling with mounting social
security payment arrears.
Despite strong political resistance, all these circumstances have prompted most
CEECs to start with pension reforms. All the countries have considered to make
parametric changes to the existing retirement schemes. There are some choices,
however, all of them inevitably meet high resistance: both retirement age and
contribution rates can be increased or the generosity of pension benefits decreased. The
latter may involve the abolition of privileges, the restriction of early retirement,
tightening of eligibility criteria for invalidity pensions, etc. However, most of the
CEECs have gone further than these changes and have recently introduced new pension
schemes.4 The ways followed by the CEECs reflect considerable diversity. There were
models (e.g. the Chilean or Argentine cases etc.) to follow but also innovative solutions
emerged. Some countries such as Latvia followed by Poland introduced notional
defined contribution (NDC) plan to the existing public tier; this has the advantage of
higher transparency, adjustment to an increase in life expectancy, incentive for formal
employment and late retirement. Most of the CEECs (except Slovakia, Romania,
Lithuania) have already introduced fully-funded (FF) schemes. Even those countries that
have been more cautious towards reforms are going to follow suit. Many countries have
built or still consider to create a three-pillar system consisting of a public PAYG
system, a mandatory privately managed second pillar, and a voluntary third pillar (e.g.
Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, etc.). Since 2000 Slovenia has built up a supplementary
fully funded pillar to the reformed PAYG system and, although it is voluntary, it may
become part of wage contracts (EBRD, 2000). Some countries still suffer from
significant implementation problems. Even the World Bank, a major proponent of FF
schemes advocates now a gradualist strategy in pension reforms. Theoretically private
pension funds have some advantage in comparison to unfunded or PAYG systems. In
the latter system pensions are financed by contributions from current workers (i.e. by
intergenerational redistribution) while in the former individual capitalization accounts
provide for more transparency and justice. Furthermore, private funds that collect
savings for old age can contribute to the development of local capital markets,  which
may lead to better portfolios. Nevertheless, considerable uncertainties still exist whether
to what extent these pension reforms can contribute to raise national savings (see
section 2.2.). As Samwick (2000) argues,  no country other than Chile that has moved
towards FF-schemes has yet experienced a significant increase in savings since the
reform began. Also Miles and Timmermann (1999) have found FF pension reforms
risky and the transition rather expensive. By analyzing the experience of the EU
member countries they have concluded: both funded and unfunded systems bear some
risks, but they are certainly different. In the former case, heavy reliance upon equity
                                                
4
 But this new approach made for them possible, at least for some time, to postpone the
necessary reform measures within the existing state pension system.
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returns to generate pensioner incomes involves substantial risk (e.g. asset returns are
different in booms and slumps). Furthermore, they calculated that the transition costs of
switching to a FF system can be considerable, much higher than previous expectations.
Furthermore, these high costs should be financed by current workers. For these reasons,
they favor to have a mixed system, as there is, for example, in the Netherlands. Müller
(2000) also came to the conclusion that pension reforms in the CEECs will, in the short
and medium run, exacerbate rather than lessen the pension-related burden on the state
budget.
3.2.2. Foreign savings: filling the gap
In section 3.1. we could follow the trend of gross national saving (GNS) in
various stages of market economy transition. National savings declined throughout the
region in the early phase of transition but recovered in subsequent years. However, even
in the most advanced CEECs high and persisting current account imbalances indicate
that the huge investment needs of the candidate countries related to both transition and
catching-up cannot be fully financed from national savings: the gap is increasingly
filled by foreign savings. Because of special historical circumstances (e.g. restrictions on
private ownership during socialism, heavy indebtedness of some countries etc.) since
the beginning of transition CEECs have become heavily dependent on external
financing. Furthermore, CEECs stepped just upon the road of market economy
development when the globalization of international product and capital markets
speeded up. The spectacular growth and globalization of international financial markets
have also enhanced the role and efficiency of allocation of savings internationally.
Institutional and technical development, financial innovations have led to important
structural changes (e.g. emergence of institutional investors in allocation of savings
across the globe, etc.), a relatively new phenomenon that effects the CEECs much
stronger than countries involved in earlier enlargements of the EU. Under these
circumstances CEECs have increasingly pursued an open and outward oriented policy
stance, a direction that is strongly supported also by international organizations.
Although there are still large discrepancies across countries due to different
approaches to market reforms and foreign investors, there seems to be a convergence
by now as market economy transition proceeds and official negotiations with the EU
began. In this section I will review the main characteristics of foreign capital inflows to
the CEECs. I will heavily rely here on a recent and comprehensive study by the EBRD
(for more details see EBRD, 2000) and some other sources (see e.g. Claessens at al,
1998).
Net capital flows to the CEECs have shown big fluctuations since the start of
transition (see Figure 13), similarly to other emerging markets. It has been the
consequence of changing investors' confidence, policies pursued and macroeconomic
prospects. The share of net official flows in total net flows to the CEECs has been low
and even has decreased by now to negligible level in most countries. In recent years, out
of the ten candidate countries Romania and Bulgaria have been the main recipients of
official lending. In the other CEECs official flows have recently provided less than one
per cent of total flows.
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Of the private flows foreign direct investment (FDI) to the 10 CEECs has
increased considerably, reaching an annual amount over 15 billion dollars in 1999. The
bulk of this has been allocated to only a few countries (e.g. Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Poland). As for cumulated FDI per capita (1989-99), Hungary, the Czech
Republic and Estonia are leading the row, all have attracted over one thousand dollars
of FDI per head of population. It should be added, however, that some other countries
such as Bulgaria, Slovakia or Poland have registered their ever largest FDI inflows in
recent years (see Figure 14). FDI is still much related to privatization of state-owned
assets. In the past some years, cash privatization of companies to strategic investors, in
particular in the banking and telecommunication sectors, has attracted a considerable
part of FDI to the CEECs. Countries nearing the completion of their privatization
schemes (see e.g. Hungary) are expected to attract FDI in the forms of green-field
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investments, takeover and re-investment in existing companies. Major investments by
foreign multinational companies have contributed significantly to the favorable shift in
production and export structure that has been observable in some CEECs. Certainly,
countries that have favored other privatization methods (e.g. vouchers) to sales to
strategic foreign investors have attracted less foreign capital. From the saving and
investment point of view it should be underlined here that incoming foreign capital as
receipts for privatization of state assets is not being directly an investment per se, and
also the national income that is substituted by foreign saving does not necessarily
become saving but a source of higher consumption. FDI to the region has proved
remarkably resilient as compared to huge volatility in short-term capital flows. Thus the
relatively high share of more stable long-term flows (about 70% on average in 1999-
2000) in total private flows can be considered favorable. On the other hand, global
market turbulence related to the Asian and Russian crises has turned renewed attention
to the role of short-term flows in transition, and its institutional and regulatory aspects.
Some argue that setting-up of well-functioning and supervised financial markets seems
to be an important pre-condition to avoid increasing instability and vulnerability of the
CEECs to external setbacks and reversal in capital flows. And in this respect, many
candidate countries, including the more advanced ones, still can be considered
immature. For the same reason some see it as one of the major challenges that CEECs
will have to face in the years to come how to manage rising capital inflows while
liberalizing the capital account. Even the IMF, a major proponent of fast liberalization,
seems by now to have changed its view and recommends for the accession countries to
liberalize long-term flows first, and short-term flows only later on following more
fundamental reforms (see IMF, 2000, p. 158.).
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International bond issues and portfolio equity investment in the region’s stock
markets are the main forms of portfolio investment to the CEECs. The bulk of this has
been allocated again to a few countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland and
Hungary. (For FDI and portfolio flows to the CEECs see table 3) CEECs have
increasingly gained access to international capital markets through Eurobond issues.
48
Public sector issuers, mainly sovereigns, dominate Eurobond issues. A few blue-chip
companies in countries such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and the
Slovak Republic provide for the bulk of private Eurobond issues. While the Russian
crisis in 1998 hindered the emergence of the most advanced CEECs on the Eurobond
market, this effect turned out temporary only. Since then a considerable improvement in
investors’ confidence towards the region has been observable which can be attributed to
good economic prospects of the CEECs as well as to anticipated EU membership. This
improved confidence is reflected also by noticeably better borrowing terms (e.g. much
lower spreads and longer maturities). In some of the CEECs domestic bond markets
were also opened to foreign portfolio investors, and most of the latter have actively
invested into domestic sovereign debt instruments (e.g. on the treasury bills market in
Poland, etc.). By contrary, international equity issues from companies of the CEECs
have remained much more limited. As analyzed in section 3.2.1.1., there are only few
CEECs where local stock markets have sufficient capitalization and liquidity. Although
there were rebounds on the stock markets across the region, portfolio equity inflows to
the CEECs have continued to concentrate on a few more advanced countries, the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland. Even in these countries equity issues are dominated by
some blue-chip and huge local companies.
As for international bank lending to the CEECs, it has increased since the start
of transition. An important feature of these flows has been that private sector has taken
over as the primary recipient as compared to the banking sector. Also the maturity
structure has shifted considerably from short- to longer-term. All in all, CEECs are still
rather different in their access to international capital markets reflecting their economic
and institutional development and policy stance. However, it can be seen that an ever
larger selection of international financing (saving) instruments is available for them,
particularly for the most advanced CEECs, that may increase safety, reduce volatility
and also the costs of financing investments. Making use of foreign savings, especially
their more stable forms, can help to meet increasing investment needs of the CEECs,
even though they not only complement, but at least to some extent, substitute domestic
savings.
4. Run-up to and after accession: policy recommendations
It is still ambiguous when negotiations on accession of the CEECs will be
completed and they become formal members of the EU. At the moment, a case by case
approach based on "satisfying the required economic and political conditions" (the so-
called Copenhagen criteria) seems more likely, reflecting differences in levels and
stages of development, however, several important conditions of the accession are still
uncertain. Consequently, the Eastern enlargement of the EU will more likely be a multi-
phase rather than a one-time process, and will not start before 2003, at best. By that time
even the EU should be prepared to admit new members that requires, among others, to
progress with controversial institutional reforms. In the years to come the candidate
countries should proceed with market and institutional reforms to be able to face
competition in the Single European Market. The target of EU membership can also
serve as a driving force to continue reform efforts. Also the applicants may become
more attractive for foreign investors both within and outside Europe.
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Table 3
Foreign direct and portfolio investments to the CEECs
(Million USD)
Bulgaria Czech R. Estonia Hungary Poland Latvia Lithuania Romania Slovakia Slovenia
         Cumulated up to 1998 1999 1999 1999 1998 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999
Inward FDI 1,348.3 16,246 2,467.3 19,191 22,479 1,885 2,063 5,296 2,817 2,683.5
FDI abroad 3.5 908 281.2 1,482 1,165 215 25.9 133 340 621
Portfolio investment (Assets) 602.1 2,900 305.2 367 1,093 533 32.5 1,112 145 62.7
Portfolio investment (Liabilities) 5,148.9 4,602 771.8 16,934 13,658 275 833.6 2,521 1,843 1,733.5
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 2000. Based on balance of payments statistics.
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To the degree comprehensive market reforms proceed, stability can be
reinforced in the region. This can provide favorable but necessary conditions for long-
run growth and catching-up. A crucial question will be whether CEECs can maintain or
enhance the momentum of reforms in areas where they are less advanced (e.g. financial
sector, corporate restructuring and governance, social security systems, etc.). We could
see in the previous sections that these areas have much to do either with enhancing the
efficiency of saving allocation, or the increased level of gross savings. By 2000 all the
CEECs have already achieved growth. Several candidate countries have good prospects
for sustaining growth trends, however, some of them, where recovery is still fragile and
less broadly based, should face higher risk of future setbacks and the subsequent need
for further adjustments. When looking at the main macroeconomic indicators we could
observe a convergence by impressive improvement in recent years, however, structural
and institutional indicators of transition, which are indicators for the long-run
sustainability of growth, have shown much discrepancies across countries.
Restructuring and modernization of the CEEC economies, a precondition of sustainable
growth, require to maintain high rates of investment. And indeed, high investment rates
achieved in most of the CEECs indicate that this development is well underway. It can
be encouraged by alleviating impediments to private sector activity, but should also be
underpinned by sound domestic savings, in order to escape unsustainable external
imbalances and high vulnerability to changes in investors’ sentiment. However, some of
the less advanced CEECs are still struggling with depressed national saving rates that
make them impossible to meet investment demand stemming either from the needs of
transition or of modernization necessary to satisfy the conditions of EU membership.
One of the most significant risks throughout the region in the years to come will be
high, and in some cases, increasing current account deficits. Although this trend, on the
other side, indicates an increasing inflow of foreign capital to the CEECs, the key
question is whether this can be sustained. If external imbalances are getting stuck at a
high level over a longer period of time, it may indicate inefficient use of foreign capital
and weak contribution to economic restructuring. However, without such restructuring
neither economic growth can be sustained nor catching-up completed. More flexible
exchange rates may automatically indicate the disequilibrium that would lead to
persistent current account deficits.
As for savings, the most certain way of increasing the rate of saving is via
growth. Recovery can lead to an improvement in income position of both enterprises
and households that may draw up savings, and via higher revenues it can improve the
government’s budget position as well.  This trend can be, at least partially, offset by
some other factors. Following several years of contraction, real incomes of households
have actually increased in most CEECs. However, this development is only partly
reflected in higher savings but an increase in current consumption. Anticipated
prosperity and permanent income growth (related to a large part to EU accession) are
supposed to lead to this latter pattern, as do takeover of Western consumer habits. The
ever increasing use of consumer credits (and also mortgage loans, as well as in some
countries such as Hungary loans for construction/buying houses), is expected to have
the same effects. Because of these trends no traditional means of government control
(e.g. interest rates) are likely to prove efficient enough in the household sector. The
utilization  of incomes cannot be debated on moral grounds, but should be kept under
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control, otherwise it will deteriorate international competitiveness, and through higher
imports of consumer goods may increase trade and current account deficits. Sustaining
global competitiveness can be considered inevitable to keep foreign investors’ interest
alive.
As international experience shows us, the increase in public saving (or decrease
in dissaving) can be the most direct and efficient way of how government policy can
improve national saving rates. Although there is still considerable potential for
improving general government balances (and especially the efficiency of government
services), the CEECs actually  have very limited room for maneuvering. Ensuring
conditions for a long-run growth track requires huge expenditures by the government
sector. As underlined, investment  into the creation of knowledge (R&D) and in human
capital (education, health), is a precondition for long-run sustainable growth and global
competitiveness in our age, even though it is expected to bring fruits in the longer run.
However, over many years most governments were forced to cut expenditure on
developing these strategic sectors due to a decrease in revenues and increase in social
security spending. There are several fields (like infrastructure, environment, etc.) where
CEECs are still underdeveloped as compared to EU countries, thus requiring substantial
amount of resources to invest there. Development of the banking and non-banking
financial sector still falls short of their EU counterparts in most CEECs, although
without it neither financial integration in the EU, nor efficient collection and allocation
of saving can be achieved. Building a sound financial system is also a precondition for
sustaining economic stability and avoiding financial turmoil. Recapitalization and
reform of the banking system is still underway in most CEECs and will require large
amount of capital.
To control unmanageable expenditure growth, reform of the social security
system cannot be avoided. Due to high transition costs, reform of the pension system is
not likely to result in a noticeable increase in gross savings, nor a decrease in general
government deficits, at least in short to medium run. Setting-up FF pension funds may
have a favorable impact on household savings. However, without parallel progress in
administration/supervision of pension funds and development of capital  markets they
will not meet expectations. Owing to existing obligations, no radical change can be
expected unless the generosity of existing PAYG pension systems is also reduced.
Increasing uncertainty over future pensions may encourage people to look for other
forms of pre-cautionary savings.
With growth gaining momentum throughout the region, governments’ revenues
are expected to increase and also the burden of unemployment benefits may ease
somewhat. Raising of taxes should be avoided, if possible, hence it can repress the
propensity to save for business and because statutory tax rates are already high. Where
it is justified, the structure of taxes can be modified. However, there is still much scope
in improving the efficiency of tax collection. As stated in section 2. tax incentives have
usually less to do with creation of new savings but may evoke portfolio shifts. Because
of competition policy reasons, favoring strategic sectors by tax incentives will become
ever harder to manage as accession comes near. In the years to come most governments
will face the dilemma how to cover substantial expenditure needs (as mentioned before)
while tax/debt increase should be avoided and privatization revenue is on the decline.
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A key growth factor is how macroeconomic environment and business climate
evolve. That is what government policy can and must influence the best. An
environment conducive to businesses, indigenous and foreign alike, may improve
profitability of firms, thus a growing number of companies will be able to invest from
retained earnings, the cheapest form of financing. To this end, urging of corporate
restructuring should also be enhanced, a field where most CEECs have remained
backward. The efforts cannot be confined only to large privatized (mostly foreign-
owned) companies, but should cover SMEs, as well. Focusing only on luring foreign
multinational companies may have unwanted consequences, and the indigenous
enterprise sector of the CEECs will have less chance to withstand the sharp competition
on the Single European Market, and this may have negative consequences on gross
corporate saving, as well. Theoretically, due to increased competition, less efficient
firms are driven out of market that may result in a growing overall profitability of the
enterprise sector. Nevertheless, the concept of creative destruction does not always
seem to work properly in the practice. If a considerable part of SMEs are not able to
survive in the long run (owing to lack of a level-playing field, and not only because of
the presence of free competition), this will prevent favorable structural changes from
spreading over the whole economy. This segment of the corporate sector should be
better targeted by various programmes (similarly to several Community-level and
member-country schemes), well before accession. Catching-up to the EU in terms of
income per capita can be achieved even if regional discrepancies as well as differences
between indigenous SMEs and large foreign-owned firms widen. Catching-up should be
prompted and realized in these company segments and fields, as well.
Although government budgets are already overburdened, and there are a lot of
tasks to undertake, the accession itself requires substantial additional resources to
spend. Compliance with environmental standards, transport infrastructure, legal
harmonization, institutional building etc. all require additional expenditures. Several
recent studies (see e.g. IMF 2000, EBRD 2000) have tried to estimate the fiscal costs
related to EU accession. The two largest areas of pre-accession expenditure are the
compliance with legal and institutional building requirements of the acquis and with the
environmental standards of the EU. In the environment sector, water and air pollution
as well as waste management account for the bulk of expected costs that are estimated
to be about 1.5 per cent of GDP per year on average, however, less advanced CEECs
should accommodate much higher costs. Fiscal costs of meeting EU requirements in the
transport sector related mainly to building Trans-European networks, are put even
higher, and are estimated to be about 2.5 per cent of GDP per year on average. There are
also large discrepancies across countries, reflecting their size as well as the present
development level of their transport infrastructure. Environmental and transport costs
together may sum up to 4 per cent of GDP per year on average, at least for a decade or
more. We have some estimates on recent accession related spending for some of the
most advanced CEECs. In Hungary, for instance, the National Programme for the
Adoption of the Acquis estimated a total EU related expenditure of about 2.5 per cent of
GDP for the years 2000 and 2001, of which less than one-third will be covered by EU-
transfers. Most of the costs are born by the central budget, and the remaining part by
local governments and the private sector. Costs related to meeting requirements in other
sectors of the CEECs (e.g. steel, energy, nuclear safety, agriculture,
telecommunications, consumer protection etc.) should also be added that may amount to
total costs of up to 10 per cent of GDP by some guesstimates. Furthermore, some of the
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CEECs have recently joined the NATO and committed  themselves to raise defense
spending that may induce additional fiscal pressure. Although the reliability of these
estimates is uncertain, without any doubt CEECs should make enormous efforts to
accommodate fiscal costs related to accession. A crucial question is to what extent these
additional costs will be financed by EU-transfers. The EU has made available pre-
accession support for all the candidate countries for the period 2000-2006 (see decision
by the European Council at the Berlin summit in March 1999) with an annual amount of
EUR 3.1 billion, implying a support averaging about 1 per cent of GDP per year up to
2006, or until a candidate becomes EU member. This pre-accession financing provides
assistance in the fields of technical assistance and training (Phare), agriculture
(SAPARD), infrastructure and environment (ISPA). Assistance in the form of loans by
EIB and EBRD is also available.
After EU accession, the new member countries will be eligible for assistance
from EU Structural and Cohesion Funds and agricultural support. However, according
to recent plans, financial support of the EU will most likely be less generous than during
former enlargements of the EU. Practically it means that new members can get less
support in the new financial framework than they would get under the present system.
New members will have to make contributions to the EU budget, as well. To control
increase in the costs of support, the EU has limited the structural assistance in any
member state to 4 per cent of the national GDP. The EU budget as a whole is also
subject to a ceiling of 1.27 per cent of EU aggregate GNP. Furthermore, for safety
reasons, the EU has also agreed to a medium-term financial framework for an enlarged
EU comprising 21 countries and to set aside financial support of about 1.2 per cent of
current GDP per year exclusively for new members starting from 2002. Levels and
forms of a new EU assistance framework after 2006 are still rather uncertain. One can
see that using any methods for calculation, there remains a significant gap to be
financed either by the governments or the private sector of the CEECs. There seems to
be an important difference as compared to former enlargements of the EU when less
advanced countries became members. The burden of adjustment to EU requirements is
now higher than ever, but most of this financing should be covered by the applicant
countries from their own limited sources. Most of the transfers from the EU in the
Community Support Framework are likely to supplement national savings owing to co-
financing requirements. Thus crowding out effects are expected to fall short of
crowding in ones. These transfers are expected to mobilize domestic private and public
capital for financing EU-supported projects. As the experience of less developed but
successful member countries suggests, EU-transfers may give an important impetus to
development in the very sectors (e.g. infrastructure, education etc.) which have strategic
importance in long-term development. However, the efficiency of these projects is not
taken for granted. This highlights the importance of efficiency, competence and
surveillance in allocation of funds. With clear and well-elaborated national programmes
in line with EU support, common goals can more likely be achieved. The broad
experience of several recent member states in these fields should be more thoroughly
analyzed.
It would be very important to realize that, at least in the run-up period to
accession, CEECs should focus primarily on real convergence (i.e. growth,
restructuring, etc.) and at least for some time attribute less attention to achieve as
quickly as possible their ultimate goal of euro area accession. In particular, the
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Maastricht criteria of meeting inflation, fiscal and exchange rate requirements could
potentially be in conflict with real adjustment and catching-up requirements of the
CEECs. Although the candidate countries are not required to become euro-area
members as a precondition for EU membership, they should adhere to the aims of
economic and monetary union (EMU). Realistically, to meet the Maastricht criteria on a
durable basis they will need adjustment periods, the length of which varies across
countries (see also IMF, 2000). It would neither be in the interest of the CEECs nor the
EU to reduce the scope for real convergence. Prospects for a successful Eastern
enlargement would improve if the EU was more tolerant concerning the transition-
related characteristics of the CEECs, and provided a share of the resources necessary for
adjustment as high as possible.
On the other hand, CEECs should become aware that it is not enough only to
focus on meeting all the requirements related to the EU accession but to prepare their
own transparent and well-founded development strategies. The experience of countries
with impressive catching-up records clearly demonstrates that a well-thought out and
forward-looking country strategy and wide social consensus behind that can largely
improve the expected results and choices of a successful catching-up. The insufficiency
of domestic financial resources presumes even more consciousness in allocation
towards fields with better perspectives.
All in all, according to my view the most important question from the point of
view of catching-up is not that how to enhance gross national saving in the CEECs, but
how to encourage and put in motion a virtuous cycle of high growth, high investment
and high saving. Thus saving should constitute an element (although an important one)
of a much wider and coherent economic policy that draws up clear goals and signals for
market players. As Levine and Renelt (1992) pointed out, national policies appear to be
a complex package, thus interactions among policies should also be analyzed as
opposed to the independent influence of any particular policy.
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